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INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUSTOMER 







Customer Wait Time (CWT) measures all supply chain processes, from the time a 
customer places an order until the item is delivered.  The Marine Corps intermediate 
supply activity, the Supply Management Unit (SMU), has the primary task of reducing 
the amount of time it takes for the operating forces to receive supplies by stocking items 
close to the warfighter.  Such forward positioning of repair parts shields the operating 
forces from delays found at the wholesale inventory level, thereby increasing the material 
readiness of the operating forces.  Intuitively, decreasing CWT increases operational 
availability (Ao), but the degree and magnitude of this relationship has yet to be 
quantified.   This lack of understanding pertaining to the relationship between Ao and 
CWT has led to arbitrary stock policies that do not account for the cost and benefit they 
provide.  This project centers on monetizing the relationship between these variables 
through simulation modeling, and provides a tool whereby stock determination can be 
made based on desired end states. 
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According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011), the total 
spending on logistics by the Department of Defense in 2010 amounted to over  
$210 billion. The GAO website acknowledges that supply chain management has been, 
and continues to be, one of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) “key weaknesses” (GAO, 
2012) every year dating back to 1990. The latest report by the GAO came out in July of 
2011, and it provides that the DoD “does not have the performance measures that assess 
the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the supply chain across the enterprise” (GAO, 
2011). Because Supply Chain Management is listed as a key weakness for DoD, their 
supply chain management practices have been placed on a watch list and Congress has 
charged DoD with correcting this problem. DoD’s latest response is the 2010 Logistics 
Strategic Plan (GAO, 2011).   
The Logistics Strategic Plan seeks to find areas to reduce DoD’s excess 
inventories. The DoD solution to reduction of inventory, however, is not aimed at across 
the board cuts, but instead finding inventory efficiencies through the improvement of 
requisition tracking and information. These are enterprise solutions that pertain beyond 
any one service. Adding asset visibility and real time requisition capabilities can reduce 
such factors as customer wait time (CWT), which correspondingly will reduce 
maintenance down time (MDT). Asset visibility aids DoD in knowing how much 
inventory it has on hand and in the transportation pipeline at any one time. As demand 
data, asset visibility, and CWT information is refined, DoD is in a better position to 
predict its required inventory per period of time. The first step to achieving these types of 
inventory reductions is the implementation of the right measures of effectiveness. 
On December 14, 2000, the USD AT&L released DoD Instruction 4140.61 
entitled Customer Wait Time and Time Definite Delivery that directed all services to 
implement the use of CWT to measure the responsiveness of their systems. The 
instruction defined CWT as “a measurement of the total elapsed time between the 
issuance of a customer order and satisfaction of that order” (DoD Instruction, 2000, p. 2). 
This directive was all encompassing, and charged each service with taking the necessary 
 2 
steps to fully implement and report the use of CWT as a performance measure (DoD 
Instruction, 2000). CWT allows for the computation of lead-time and serves to aid DoD 
agencies in establishing accurate levels of safety stock to satisfy demand.   
The relationship between CWT and operational availability (Ao) is the focus of this study.   
There are three potential benefits to using CWT to measure performance.   
First, CWT can be used to determine lead-time in the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) 
and other common inventory stocking methodologies. Secondly, CWT can be used to 
measure effectiveness of the supply chain. Through the effective implementation of 
CWT, DoD can show whether or not supply support agencies are meeting their customer 
service goals.   Lastly, the relationship between Ao and CWT can show how forward 
positioned inventories lend to reductions in the equipment down time and improved 
equipment readiness.   According to Girardini, Lackey, and Peltz (2007), the key to high 
equipment readiness is the proper stocking methodologies of Supply Support Activities.   
The Supply Support Activity for the Marine Corps is Supply Management Unit 
(SMU).   The SMU is an intermediate retail activity that is responsible for sustaining a 
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for 60 days while in a forward deployed 
environment.   The SMU’s tasks include “requirements determination, stock 
replenishment, issue and redistribution actions, inquiry response, and excess/disposal 
determination” (USMC, 1984). In the continental United States (CONUS), this 
responsibility remains unchanged, and the SMU focuses on sustaining training and 
operations of units and at home station as well as abroad. 
Although each SMU activity independently supports operations of its 
respective MEF, CWT metrics in the Marine Corps are aggregated by Marine Corps 
Logistics Command (MarCorLogCom), in Albany, Georgia instead of being tracked at 
each of the intermediate supply activity level (IG, 2007). This poses problems in 
identifying the effectiveness of each SMU, and developing best practices. The Marine 
Corps has intermediate supply activities at each of the MEFs and it is the measurement of 
each SMU’s performance that matters most.   
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A. THE PROBLEM 
 Certain critical repair parts are consistently shown to have longer customer wait 
times, and are common contributors long periods of delay when equipment is not mission 
capable, or deadlined. The intuitive understanding that a decrease in CWT will have a 
positive effect on Ao can be quantified through the mathematical formula for Ao which 
shows that CWT is one of several factors that determine Ao. However, turning this 
intuition into a precise, actionable quantification involves a detailed study of the 
relationship between CWT and Ao over time, because CWT and the other factors that 
determine Ao are stochastic, and may not have a stable distribution over time (they may 
not be stationary). Since the factors determining Ao are stochastic, then although an 
investment in CWT may on average have a given effect on Ao the return on that 
investment will itself be stochastic as well. In addition, since the factors may not be 
stationary, then an investment made in reducing CWT in 2012 based on 2011 data may 
not have the predicted effect in 2013. 
 Hence, the precise actionable relationship between CWT is an empirical question 
that cannot be simply quantified by examining the average values of the factors involved 
and resorting to the formula. The quantification instead requires an analysis of the 
distributions of the random variables involved and their stability over time. To be useful, 
such quantification would need to predict an associated improvement in Ao at varying 
amounts of investment in critical consumable repair parts along the supply chain, and 
provide some estimate of the riskiness of such an investment. Therefore, this study was 
started based on the following research questions: 
1)  What is the impact to Ao when we reduce CWT for repair parts that deadline 
equipment?  
2)   What levels of investment can we make to reduce CWT in a cost-effective 
way? 
B. PRE-POSITIONING CRITICAL REPAIR PARTS 
One of the main purposes of the SMU is to reduce the amount of time it takes the 
operating forces to receive supplies.   To do this the SMU forward positions inventory in 
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it warehouses fulfills customer orders out of stock first.   The purpose of this study is to 
determine what benefit, if any, forward positioned stock has on Ao. To narrow the scope 
of our basic research questions, we limit our investigation to forward positioned stock as 
the solution. With this possible solution in mind, we established the following secondary 
research questions that will drive our study: 
1) Can we model the variability in CWT for critical parts? 
2) Can we capture the stochastic relationship between variability in CWT and Ao 
for deadlining parts in a simulation model? 
3) How can we determine the validity of our simulation model? 
4) What CWT thresholds should we examine for target reduction? 
5) What should our desired service level be for part stocking criteria? 
6) What improvements in terms of Ao will we realize on our investment in CWT 
reduction, and what is the riskiness of that investment? 
As we build our methodology into a simulation model, we answer these questions 
in order to demonstrate the nature of the relationship between CWT and Ao. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 The relationship between CWT and Ao relies on understanding a myriad of supply 
and maintenance terms, definitions, concepts, and processes. We first provide 
background information to lay a foundation for the link between CWT and Ao. 
A. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
1. Customer Wait Time 
Customer Wait Time can be expressed as the time between all supply chain 
processes from the initial induction of a repair part into a requisition system to the receipt 
of the part by the initiating customer.   The customer is the maintenance organization that 
will utilize the repair part to restore a Principal End Item (PEI) to a serviceable condition. 
For this study, the customer is either the organic level maintenance personnel at the 
operational battalion/squadron or the intermediate level maintenance organization when 
maintenance actions are passed to them. The final customer in the maintenance cycle is 
the battalion/squadron commander who is responsible for employing the PEI in the 
performance of assigned missions.  
2. Equipment Readiness (R) and Operational Availability (Ao)  
The terms operational availability and equipment readiness are closely related, yet 
are not exactly synonymous. These terms are used as indicators of the total amount of 
equipment that is available for use by the battalion/squadron commander. The readiness 
rate is defined as the state of a pool of assets that is available and ready to use in 
performing its intended functions, and is stated as the percentage of all assets that are 
fully mission capable (FMC) at a given time. The Marine Corps generally uses the term 
readiness, or R-Rating, to determine the percentage of equipment that is available for use. 
Readiness in the Marine Corps is determined using the following equation:  





 While readiness measures the number of assets available for use at a point in time, 
Ao is a measurement of the percentage of time an item is available under certain 
operating conditions (Jones, 2006). Both of these measures will change over time as 
operating conditions change and as items are brought in and out of a mission capable 
status. Ao is a function of the mean time between failure (MTBF) of an asset (or uptime), 







For our study, this maintenance downtime (MDT) is considered to be the time that 
an asset is not operational due to deadlining maintenance requirements. MTBF is 
calculated as the average number of days that an asset was operationally available for use 
between repairs. Downtime is measured as the mean time to repair (MTTR) plus 
administrative delay time (ADT) plus the time that the customer must wait for repair 
parts to arrive in order to conduct maintenance (CWT). MTTR includes all maintenance 
action time from the time that critical repair parts have been received and the date that an 
Equipment Repair Order (ERO) is downgraded to a non-deadlining ERO or the date that 
the ERO is closed. ADT includes time waiting for technical data, maintenance personnel 
and equipment availability, inspection time, time awaiting further actions, and the time 
lost due to human error. Bearing these factors in mind total downtime is calculated as 
follows (DoN, 2003): 
Downtime MTTR AD CWT T= + +  
Therefore, the Ao equation can be extended as shown below:  
o
MTBF




3. National Stock Number (NSN) 
Each repair part is assigned its own thirteen-digit National Stock Number. The 
critical repair parts that are required to ensure operational readiness are primarily Class 
IX, which is defined as “all repair parts and components, including kits, assemblies, and 
 7 
subassemblies (reparable and non-reparable) required for maintenance to support all 
equipment” (MCO 4400.15E, p. 8–7).   
4. Consumable Repair Part 
This is a classification of Class IX which includes all items that are non-reparable 
and are discarded after use, and all items that are expended when used (Jones, 2006, 
p.18.1). This study will primarily focus on consumable repair parts that deadline 
equipment. 
5. Secondary Reparable (SECREP) 
Secondary Reparables (SECREP) are major components to end items that are 
repairable at appropriate maintenance echelons. While SECREPs are considered to be 
Class IX, this study will focus on consumable repair parts due to the varying stock 
determination methods between SECREPs and consumables as well as the varying 
general availability between SECREPs and consumables. SECREPS are also typically 
part of the initial sparing calculation provided in the contract when a PEI is fielded. 
Because SECREPs are not under the same cognizance as consumables, the scope of our 
study is limited to consumable repair parts. We desire a realistic representation of the 
impact that can be obtained by only pre-positioning consumables, given the impact that 
SECREPs also have upon readiness. Thus, we included SECREPs in the overall 
determination of readiness; however, we excluded them from the decision criteria for 
additional pre-position stock or modifications to CWT. This exclusion is based upon the 
Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability Codes (SMRC) as described in the Joint 
Regulation Governing the Use and Application of Uniform Source Maintenance and 
Recoverability Codes. 
B. PROCESSES 
1. The Marine Corps Legacy Maintenance Process 
 When a Principle End Item (PEI) ceases to operate or perform at a level necessary 
to conduct assigned tasks (shoot, move, or communicate) it is inducted into the 
maintenance cycle. Using the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System 
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(MIMMS), maintenance personnel at the operational battalion or squadron open an 
Equipment Repair Order (ERO). When an ERO is opened it is done so with a Non-
Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM) Indicator that identifies that the problem is now 
being determined and is in the hands of maintenance personnel. This NMCM Indicator 
signals the beginning of MDT, also commonly known as repair cycle time (RCT). 
Immediately upon induction, a maintenance technician performs a complete limited 
technical inspection (LTI) on the equipment to troubleshoot the problem with the item 
and determine what course of action is needed to repair the item. If the technician is able 
to return the item to full service, then he does so immediately. If the repairs required on 
the PEI are beyond the organic maintenance capability of a particular battalion or 
squadron, then it must be inducted to the next higher echelon of maintenance. Each MEF 
has a Maintenance Battalion where intermediate maintenance is conducted. Upon 
induction at this echelon of maintenance, the maintenance battalion technicians are 
required to open another ERO and must conduct an LTI on the equipment to determine 
the best course of action to repair the item according to their maintenance capabilities.   
 Whether at the organic (operational) or intermediate level, once the parts needed 
to restore the end item to serviceability are identified, the NSNs are recorded on an 
Equipment Repair Order Shopping List (EROSL). The maintenance technician passes 
this EROSL on to a supply clerk who signs the EROSL acknowledging receipt. The time 
it takes for the maintenance technician to deliver the EROSL to the supply clerk plus the 
time that passes before the supply clerk inducts the requisition into the supply system 
contribute to ADT. The life of this supply requisitions will be covered below, but once all 
maintenance actions are complete the ERO goes into a Non-Mission Capable Supply 
(NMCS) status indicating that the problem now lies in the hands of the supply system. 
 Once an ordered item is received, it is issued to the requesting maintenance 
section. When all needed parts ordered for one ERO are received, the status of the ERO is 
changed back to NMCM telling the commander that the equipment is still broken and it is 
a maintenance problem again. For critical repairs, maintenance personnel are required to 
return the item back to full service as quickly as possible and when all maintenance 
actions have been completed and the repair has been checked for both quality and 
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operability, the ERO is downgraded, if awaiting other less critical parts, or closed. The 
status change between NMCM and NMCS is designed to place ownership on the source 
that is responsible for the delay.  
2. The Marine Corps Legacy Supply Requisition Process 
 Upon the receipt of the EROSL, the supply clerk assigns a Military Standard 
Requisitioning & Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) Document Number to each NSN needed 
to repair the PEI. The document number is used to track the status of the requisition from 
order to receipt. Ideally, prior to the close of business on the day the EROSL was 
received, the supply clerk will enter each document number into the Asset Tracking and 
Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS) database, which converts EROSL data into 
MILSTRIP form, and will create and send this data to the SMU for processing into the 
Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) mainframe. This marks the beginning of 
measurable CWT. The time it takes validate EROSL’s, enter them into the ATLASS 
database, and submit them is another contributor to the ADT of the repair cycle of an 
asset. 
 The first stop for a requisition placed by units in the MEF is the SMU, which is 
the primary source of supply for repair parts. The I MEF SMU supports 86 units 
distributed across California and into Arizona. They carry over 22,000 National Stock 
Numbers (NSN) that represent more than $62 million in inventory. In their legacy supply 
interface, the SMU submitted requisitions via batch process into the SASSY mainframe 
at the end of the business cycle or once a day. This procedure adds on average one half-
day to the lead-time for these requisitions. 
The SMU stocks Class IX repair parts either based on previous demand or in 
some cases when repair parts are pushed to the SMU in anticipation of demand for newly 
fielded items. If a repair part is not stocked by the SMU, the requisition will be passed to 
the wholesale supply level within the Defense Automated Addressing System (DAAS) 
for fulfillment at one of DoD’s National Inventory Control Points (NICP’s) (Bates, 
2005). The DAAS Center (DAASC) is a huge data processing center that operates 24 
hours a day, 365 days per year and processes all requisitions for the entire DoD (Bates, 
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2005). DAASC will determine the best source of supply (SOS) to source the needed item 
and will route the requisition to that SOS for fulfillment. The NICPs include such entities 
as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the General Services Administration (GSA), 
and the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). If the SMU 
stocks a repair part, but does not have the part on hand when a requisition is submitted, 
the SMU will issue a backorder for the item and issue the part when the item is 
replenished in their stocks. Once the ordering unit receives the repair part from the SMU 
or from other channels, the part is delivered to the maintenance section that ordered it. 
Measurable CWT for that particular document ends when the package exchanges hands 
and the transaction is recorded in ATLASS and submitted to SASSY. The time it takes to 
hand off the item, as well as to process the appropriate receipt transaction is another 




III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In 2000, the Department of Defense (DoD) implemented CWT as a metric for 
measuring the end-to-end supply chain effectiveness with DoD Instruction 4140.61. 
Since then, the DoD has been trying to measure its effective implementation and has 
aimed at tying the impact of CWT’s effect on material readiness. The relationship 
between the variables is apparent; CWT resides within the denominator of the Ao 
equation. To find a starting point for measuring the benefit of forward positioned stock, a 
review of other attempts at identifying the relationship between CWT and Ao is 
necessary. There are three significant cases that aided in our determination to use 
simulation analyze the impact between Ao and CWT. 
A. DIAGNOSING THE ARMY’S EQUIPMENT READINESS:  THE 
EQUIPMENT DOWNTIME ANALYZER (EDA) 
In August of 2002, the U.S. Army sponsored a study by the RAND Corporation to 
gain some insight into how equipment readiness is affected by stock held by their Supply 
Support Activities (Peltz et. al, 2002). RAND’s study found that the Army had difficulty 
linking the logistics process to equipment readiness. To solve this problem RAND 
developed the Equipment Downtime Analyzer (EDA), which is a relational database that 
ties maintenance events to supply chain performance (Peltz et al., 2002). The focus of the 
EDA is to break down all the events that drive “broke-to-fix” time to identify problems 
so they can be resolved. The authors argue that resolving these problems will intuitively 
reduce MDT and as a result will increase readiness.  
During their study of the Army’s maintenance reporting capabilities, Peltz et al. 
(2002) found that the Army’s readiness numbers were expressed as Not Mission Capable 
(NMC) rates and were derived by taking the product of average end item repair time and 
the item failure rates. The Army’s supply and readiness reporting systems only tells what 
is broken, but does not mention how many times items have failed or the duration of their 
failure (Peltz, 2002). Like the Marine Corps’ current method of readiness reporting, the 
Army reports its readiness numbers monthly via the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System (DRRS). Solely using readiness information on a monthly basis made it difficult 
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to distinguish between operational time and garrison time (Peltz et al., 2006). As a result, 
the study deemed that finding the relationship between CWT and Readiness was 
“impossible (Peltz et al., 2002 p. Xiii)” with the data collection methods the Army was 
using. The main purpose of the EDA is to provide a means whereby the Army could 
focus resources where they had the greatest impact on equipment readiness (Peltz et al., 
2002) and that Ao is intuitively improved as we reduce CWT. 
Legacy readiness reporting in the Army is highlighted by looking at availability as 
a monthly number that is aggregated amongst all items a unit possesses. Peltz et al. 
(2006) found that daily measurements of readiness rates fluctuated dramatically around 
the averages reported. This variance showed that readiness as a reporting metric was 
misleading, and did not accurately tell a Commander what percent of his assets would be 
available during a given time period or during operations. This section of their research 
led us to look beyond averages and incorporate the use of variability of CWT into this 
project. 
In their study, Peltz et al. (2002) highlight that the demand signal for repair parts 
is not continuous within DoD due to the fact that training schedules are not continuous, 
and equipment does not have steady utilization rates. This erratic demand leads to erratic 
patterns in equipment readiness. As a result, the DoD experiences periods of intense 
ordering and maintenance, followed by lulls. Prior to an exercise, readiness tends to be 
high; conversely, following an exercise, it drops. This drop generally serves as the trigger 
for periods of aggravated demand for DoD (Peltz et al., 2002).  
Despite their model being able to identify maintenance events for repair parts that 
should be stocked, Eric Peltz and his team found that there was “no way to measure 
whether a reduction in wholesale requisition wait time (RWT) flows through the system 
to produce an equivalent improvement in equipment readiness” (Peltz et al., 2002). The 
next major study into the relationship between CWT and Readiness came in 2007, when 




B. DOD IG UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR CUSTOMER WAIT TIME 
In July of 2007, the DoD Office of Inspector General submitted a report to 
Congress entitled “Uniform Standards for Customer Wait Time.”  The fact that Supply 
Chain Management has been identified as one of the high risk areas within the DoD since 
1990 is what generated the need for such a report (IG, 2007). This report serves as a 
report card on the progress of CWT implementation in DoD.  
From Operation Desert Storm, when DoD faced an average CWT of 49 days, 
through 2006, when CWT was reported to average 21 days, supply chain improvement 
has been an arduous task (Gansler, 2007). The commission’s report cited DoD’s goal for 
CWT as 15 days for both the Army and Marine Corps in 2006. Fifteen days may be 
considered unsatisfactory when compared with the civilian benchmark of 1–2 days for 
domestic CWT, and 2–4 days for international CWT (Gansler, 2007). During their 
analysis, the IG found holes in reporting requirements, and was unable to show the 
relationship between CWT and readiness.  
 To measure the effectiveness of DoD’s CWT implementation, the DoD IG 
conducted a full-blown statistical analysis that sampled 1,150 Army requisitions and 773 
Marine Corps requisitions to test conformance with CWT criteria. The study found that 
the Army conforms to DoD Instruction 4140.61 by leaps and bounds ahead of the Marine 
Corps. The Army was found to have 67% of its requisitions recorded correctly, 29% not 
recorded in a timely manner, and 4% not properly vouchered. The Marine Corps, on the 
other hand, was found to only have 3% of its total requisitions recorded properly, 86% 
recorded late, and 11% not properly vouchered. This study revealed that 6 years after the 
implementation of DoD Instruction 4140.61, the various services were still not on the 
same page when it came to supply chain management and logistics transformation.  
 The second major revelation the IG study provided was that “DoD Officials could 
not link CWT to operational Readiness” (IG, 2007). The IG Report cites the improper 
categorization of requisitions as the cause of this problem, namely the lumping of both 
high and low priority requisition together. DoD Instruction 4140.61 did more than 
establish CWT as a measurement; it directed monthly reporting of both readiness and 
CWT numbers from all services. This directive was interpreted in different ways by each 
 14 
service, and because the directive was not supervised properly the numbers used were 
dramatically different. One example of the confusion with the directive is exemplified in 
the manner by which the Marine Corps determines CWT and submits its report. 
MarCorLogCom consolidates all requisition data across the three SMUs and submits 
their report at the enterprise level as one batched mix. They do not report CWT based on 
each of the independent supply activities they manage (IG, 2007).  
 Since all of the data the IG used to measure CWT and readiness came in different 
terms, the task of correlating the variables, and modeling the impact that CWT has on 
readiness was deemed impossible. The IG’s trouble with analyzing data and in 
correlating the variables is what led this study to solve the problem through simulation. If 
experts in the past have struggled with the data to arrive at a useful correlation based on 
reported CWT information, our study bridges the gap and uses actual requisitions from 
raw data to derive CWT, and simulate its impact on the Ao equation.   
The Marine Corps itself currently manages 5 major separate supply chains (each 
of the three CONUS SMUs, Afghanistan, and centralized SECREP management). As 
such, the correlation between Ao and CWT can truly only be tackled by isolating one of 
these supply chains, and further ascertain how that supply chain supports one weapon 
system. This approach is where our study continues beyond the point where the IG left 
off.  
C. STOCK DETERMINATION MADE EASY: THE ENHANCED DOLLAR 
COST BANDING MODEL (EDCBM) 
In the July-August 2007 edition of Army Logistician, the article “Stock 
Determination Made Easy” was published to discuss the “Enhanced Dollar Cost Banding 
Model” (Girardini, Lackey, & Peltz, 2007). The EDCBM is simply an extension of the 
EBA model. Like the EBA, the EDCBM is a relational database capable of drilling down 
to what items are needed, but then expands its capability in stock determination. The 
model is capable of taking limited resources and it prioritizes what items should be 
stocked based on weight, cube, cost and variability in wholesale lead times. This model 
focuses on CWT goals, and combines the capability of the intermediate supply support 
activity with the lead times from the wholesale supply activity to set CWT within certain 
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thresholds. To understand the model, it is helpful to know its origins. 
The U.S. Army stocks repair parts at the intermediate level called Supply Support 
Activities (SSA), where each SSA stocks the necessary NSNs outlined in an authorized 
stocking list (ASL) to support a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Studies by the RAND 
Arroyo Center concluded that higher fill rates from the Army’s ASLs resulted in direct 
positive effects on equipment readiness. One RAND Arroyo Center study determined that 
a 10 percent improvement in the ASL fill rate resulted in a 4 percent increase in 
equipment readiness (Girardini et. al, 2007).  
  In 1998, the RAND Arroyo Center developed Dollar Cost Banding (DCB), which 
expanded the ASL focus in three areas (Girardini et. al, 2007). First, DCB did not focus 
solely on historical demand, but considered the criticality of an item as a basis for 
stocking it, even if it experienced low demand. Cost and size were also factors, with DCB 
lowering the risk of a deadline by stocking lower cost, smaller items that would affect 
readiness. DCB also moved beyond the days of supply method of stocking parts and 
considered the variability in demand of individual NSNs in order to achieve acceptable 
CWT goals. Lastly, DCB automatically excluded non-critical items or items that the 
customer could afford to wait for which focuses the SSA resources on those critical items 
that affect readiness (Girardini et. al, 2007). 
  The EDA assisted in the development of the Enhanced DCB (EDCB), which 
narrowed the list of parts that were true readiness drivers. This allowed the SSAs to focus 
even more on criticality and reduce resource allocation of storage space and initial 
inventory investment. Operation Iraqi Freedom interrupted the expansion of EDCB. 
Home-station requirements experienced variability in demand based on training exercises 
when equipment was most used. Since home-station requirements were used to develop 
ASLs for SSAs in Iraq, fill rates plummeted as deployed operations approached a steady 
state.  The deployed SSAs that implemented EDCB experienced improvements in fill 
rates and CWT over those that did not implement the program.  
  The significance of DCB and EDCB was not that fill rates increased, but that 
CWT for critical repair parts decreased along with the ability of maintenance personnel to 
repair equipment more quickly.  This ability to repair items more quickly would 
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intuitively lead to increased readiness rates.  While this clear result of refocusing the 
stocking criteria led to these ideological outcomes, there was no measurable link 
established to show how the reduction in CWT related to the increase in readiness levels. 
Our study will refer to methods of ideal stocking criteria, but will take the next step of 
showing how the identification of critical parts and pre-positioning of them in the supply 
chain will effect a decrease in CWT, and allow us to measure the relationship between 
CWT and equipment readiness. 
D. TARGETING INVENTORIES TO AFFECT GROUND EQUIPMENT 
READINESS 
The concept of targeting repair parts that add the most to equipment down time 
for stocking is no new concept. In his 2002 article entitled Targeting inventories to affect 
ground equipment readiness, Major Brandon McGowan attests that the current stock 
methodology of the SMU does not account for the fact that not all PEI’s are created 
equal. McGowan’s article loosely covers what the SMU’s current stock method is, and 
how it misses the mark for critical end items and does not address the impact of stock 
decisions on readiness.   Major McGowan is both insightful and forward thinking in his 
solution to this problem, which amounts to categorizing items based on commanders 
precedence and assign those items a higher service level for material held at the SMU. 
 According to McGowan (2002) the SMU stock policy is to stock items with a 
certain level of demand within a certain time period. Once items have passed the demand 
requirement then they are all stocked according to the same generic formula with no 
adjustment for the importance of the item they are stocked to support. The SMU’s 
inventory level accounts for both the demand and lead-time of the item from wholesale 
supply.   McGowan argues that the flaw in this logic is that when providing the same 
service to a radio, which the marine corps has an abundance of, and a tank, which is low 
density, does not address the relative importance of these items to commanders. It is clear 
that a commander would care more about the tank being deadlined or degraded than the 
radio, and McGowan believes he has an answer to this problem. 
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 McGowan’s solution to the problem is to subcategorize items using the integrated 
logistics capability (ILC) quadrant model, and to add weight to items with degraded 
readiness reporting numbers. The ILC model categorizes the importance of items based 
on their mission value and uniqueness. There are four quadrants used in the model, which 
are listed below: 
 Quad 1:  Bottleneck Items – Low mission value and low substitutability 
 Quad 2:  Critical Items –  High mission value and low substitutability. 
 Quad 3:  Leveraged Items – High value and high substitutability 
 Quad 4:  Routine Items – Low value and high substitutability. 
McGowan insists that items stocked at the SMU should be given a different service levels 
based on where they fall within this model. McGowan also provides that aside from 
equipment ILC categorization, the SMU must consider the current readiness rate of 
individual items to determine service levels. By assigning items a threshold of 
unacceptable readiness, we can target improved readiness of those items through forward 
positioning of repair parts with increased service levels. 
 Major McGowan clearly understands that the SMU has the capability of 
significantly improving readiness through stocking the appropriate critical repair parts. In 
2002, McGowan confirms that the Marine Corps already has the tools needed to measure 
MEF readiness and track supply chain performance, but his article only describes the 
relationship between CWT and Ao as intuitive. McGowan believes that when we stock 
material based on demand and ILC categorization instead of demand alone that higher 
service levels will increase MEF readiness. A model that will show the impact of our 
stock decisions on Ao would certainly lend to Major McGowan’s study. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Many attempts have been made at tying CWT to readiness. While both the EDA, 
and EDBC models were effective at improving the responsiveness of supply support 
activities, they did not provide the means whereby CWT and readiness could be married. 
In addition, the DoD IG set out to use methods that were established by their very own 
directive, and found that at the DoD level, the information is too aggregated with far too 
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much variation in the way each service goes about recording both CWT and readiness.  
Based on what we know about past attempts to correlate readiness and CWT, this 
study will take a different approach to solve this complicated problem. The remainder of 
this report aims to solve this problem at the lowest echelon possible; this issue is not one 
for DoD, the Navy, the Army, or even the Marine Corps as a whole. What the EBA and 
EDCB models have shown is that this is an issue best solved through the lens of a 
singular end item operating in a specific area of operations. CWT for any given NSN will 
vary among different locations. NSN and PEI failure rates also vary among locations due 
to operational tempo and the physical climate. Therefore, our attempt at quantifying this 
relationship focuses on a specific geographical region with an individual end item, not the 
enterprise level. 
 The key to showing the relationship between CWT and readiness lies in the Ao 
evaluation itself. Using that equation and simulation modeling, this report intends to 
show that for a certain level of investment, decision makers can expect a certain level of 
readiness improvement. The remainder of the report describes how to simulate Ao, how to 
simulate the impact of investment in CWT reduction, and analyzes the results of these 
reductions.     
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
To establish the relationship between CWT and Ao, we had to compare the 
historical state using actual CWT with predictions from our model. Once the relationship 
was established, the main goal of our analysis was to predict a future state of reduced 
CWT that could be attained if our prescriptions regarding forward placement of inventory 
were followed. In so doing, we simulate and compare effects on Ao between the “As Is” 
and the “To Be” model outputs. 
A. DATA SOURCES AND COMPILATION 
This analysis is focused on identifying critical repairs for Mission Essential 
Principal End Items (PEIs) from I MEF that are the result of a deadlining event. The 
Marine Corps lists all Mission Essential Equipment within the annual Marine Corps 
Bulletin 3000 (MCBUL 3000) Table of Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation 
System (MARES). Equipment listed on the MCBUL 3000 is selected by Headquarters 
Marine Corps in order to provide an appropriate measure of the equipment condition and 
preparedness for the Marine Forces (MCBUL 3000, 2011). We thus narrowed our 
selection of candidate PEIs based on the MCBUL 3000. 
 In September 2011, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, 
provided a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. With future defense 
capability reduced in a world that presents increasing threats to the national security of 
the United States, General Amos highlighted the ongoing need for the expeditionary and 
amphibious nature of the United States Marine Corps (CMC, 2011). As the withdrawal 
from Iraq is complete and preparations begin for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the 
Department of Defense has shifted its focus to the Pacific Area of Operations. As a result, 
the Marine Corps will increase its focus on amphibious operations and training. 
Therefore, we selected the Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), delineated 
under the Table of Authorized Material Control Number (TAMCN) E0846, to conduct 
our analysis. This weapon system will likely see increased usage in the near future, and 
its operational availability will become critical to operational commanders. 
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Data for this study came from several resources, including the Navy Supply 
Systems Command (NAVSUP) Birdtrack database, the Marine Corps Equipment 
Readiness Information Tool (MERIT), the I MEF SMU aboard Camp Pendleton, CA, as 
well as MIMMS and SASSY databases. Data from the latter two systems has been 
consolidated by Marine Corps Logistics Command (MarCorLogCom) into the Master 
Data Repository (MDR). Data from MIMMS provided the necessary maintenance 
information to determine how long equipment was deadlined, i.e., unavailable. Data from 
SASSY gave us the requisition receipt dates for all parts ordered on ERO that were 
opened in MIMMS. Birdtrack provides inventory positioning, asset visibility, and 
customer wait time analysis that allowed us to obtain additional observations of critical 
NSN wait times, namely all requisitions that were passed to one of the National Inventory 
Control Points (the wholesale supply level).  
MarCorLogCom and Marine Corps Systems Command (MarCorSysCom) 
developed the Life Cycle Modeling Integrator (LCMI) that contains various tools to 
analyze readiness and maintenance factors for Marine Corps ground equipment. One tool 
within LCMI is the System Operational Effectiveness (SOE) application that allows 
commanders and logistics personnel to analyze data retained in the MDR. The SOE 
provides current and historical maintenance and supply information that can assist 
decision makers in identifying trends, averages, and variability for maintenance and 
supply actions. The SOE can also assist in analysis of past events that can be applied to 
forecasting decisions on maintenance and supply actions. The SOE can thus be used as a 
Decision Support Tool. The SOE provides data in several formats that allows for specific 
analysis that we discuss throughout this study.   
Beginning in 2010 the Marine Corps began its transition to an enterprise resource 
management system known as Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps (GCSS-
MC). This study covers all maintenance actions and corresponding requisitions for 
critical repair parts for all deadlining events of AAVs in I MEF from January 1, 2009 
through December 31, 2011. While the new system provides real time and up to date data 
information, our data was obtained primarily from the pre-GCSS-MC legacy systems 
(MIMMS and SASSY). We decided upon this course of action because GCSS-MC was 
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not fully fielded at the time of our study. The data and processes described within this 
study are based upon these legacy systems, which were in place from January 2009 
through the beginning of implementation of GCSS-MC for 3d Amphibious Assault 
Battalion aboard MCB Camp Pendleton in November 2011.   
MarCorLogCom provided us with a data set from the MDR that included all 
maintenance action and supply requisition data within I MEF from 2009 – 2011. Our 
analysis of these raw data files allowed us to identify all critical repair parts, degrees of 
variability in requisition wait times for those critical repair parts, and the effects of 
investments in re-positioning repair parts forward in the supply chain. Additionally, we 
identify the length of time an asset was deadlined relative to the CWT of the repair parts 
required to bring it back to serviceability.   The data collection of this study was limited 
to three years since stocking criteria over longer periods of time usually changes. As a 
result, CWT also changes between periods as stock methods are adjusted, and thus skews 
our analysis the further back we go. Limiting our study to three years provides sufficient 
breadth and depth to make this study relevant and applicable for future decision making, 
and allows us to capture the most recent and consistent data possible from the legacy 
systems.   
 When identifying the repair parts required to ensure operability of equipment, 
Combat Essentiality Codes (CEC) are assigned to each NSN to identify its criticality. 
Filtering requisition data by CEC was necessary in our methodology to identify only 
those NSNs that would have an impact on the operational readiness of an end item. As 
listed in the below table, we limited our data analysis to only the repair parts that had a 
CEC of 5 or 6. Failure of CEC 5 or 6 parts renders an end item unserviceable, and thus 
unable to perform its intended mission. Table 1 lists the definitions of CEC 5 and 6 






Table 1.   Combat Essentiality Codes 
USMC, 1984, p. 4–4–20 
Code Definition 
5 
Critical Repair Part to a Combat-Essential End Item: Those parts or 
components whose failure in a combat-essential end item will render the 
end item inoperative or reduce its effectiveness below the minimum 
acceptable level of efficiency. 
6 
Critical Repair Part to a Non-Combat-Essential End Item: Those parts or 
components whose failure in a non-combat-essential end item will render 
the end item inoperative or reduce its effectiveness below the minimum 
acceptable level of efficiency. 
 
 The CEC coding system is a standard, and may not be accurate all of the time due 
to its inflexible nature. Some repair parts on the AAV are coded with CEC 6, even though 
according to UM 4400–124, these parts are intended for non-combat essential end items. 
Therefore, we combined this factor with Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) 
Indicators to provide a more accurate picture to determine which assets were actually 
deadlined. Maintenance technicians are required to input the NMCS Indicator when they 
order a repair part on the Equipment Repair Order Shopping List (EROSL) to identify 
how important their supply requisitions are. NMCS indicators relate to the priority code 
of the requisition. Priority codes range from 01 to 15, with 01 being the highest priority 
for units in a combat zone and 15 being the lowest priority for routine items ordered by 
units outside the Fleet Marine Force and the Reserves. Our study limits the requisitions 
with priority codes between 01 and 06, which scopes our analysis to only critical 
requisitions for the operating forces within I MEF.  
 Definitions of NMCS Indicators are listed in TM 4700–15–1, Ground Equipment 
Record Procedures (1992). We limited our analysis to those maintenance actions with 
NMCS Indicators of 9, N, and E. NMCS code 9 refers to requisitions with a priority 
designator of 01, 02, or 03 for an OCONUS customer or a CONUS customer deploying 
overseas within 30 days. NMCS Code N refers to requisitions for deadlining items with 
priority designators of 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09 for a CONUS customer or 05 for an 
OCONUS customer. These codes identify a readiness reportable item or an item deemed 
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by the unit commander as mission essential to be in a deadlined state as a result of a 
critical repair part failure. NMCS Code E is used for requisitions with priority designators 
of 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07 or 08 when the PEI is expected to be deadlined in 15 days for a 
CONUS customer or within 20 days for an OCONUS customer. While NMCS Code E 
does not represent an actual deadlining event, requisitions with this code are shown to be 
critical that will result in a deadlined PEI. Thus, these items are critical to the operation of 
the vehicle and results in a deadlining event. Therefore, they are included in our analysis 
on demand and parts stocking criteria. 
 Our data analysis began with 2,315 EROs, consisting of 5,294 requisitions for all 
AAVs in I MEF during the 2009 – 2011 time period. When we filtered the data to only 
include deadlining maintenance actions, we discovered that 1,647 of those EROs were 
maintenance actions that resulted in the deadlining of an AAV. These 1,647 ERO’s 
included 3,027 requisitions for repair parts, which represented 202 NSNs. Of the 202 
NSNs identified in our study, 164 were Class IX consumables and 38 NSNs were 
SECREPs. 
 Using the SOE, we determined the mean time between failures (MTBF) for the 
AAV by extracting all deadlining maintenance events for all serial numbers within I MEF 
from 2009 - 2011. Although readiness data can be obtained daily, the Marine Corps 
reports readiness monthly in the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Marine Corps 
(DRRS-MC), a subset of DRRS. We thus chose 30 days as the basis for determining 
readiness and asset availability in our model. Subsequently, using the reliability equation, 
we determined the reliability and probability of failure of the AAV for I MEF for a 30 
day period. Thus, our simulation model represents the possible outcomes of Ao for a 30 
day period. 
 Mean Time to Repair and Administrative Down Time (MTTR + ADT) in our 
study includes all actions taken before a part is ordered, and after the repair part is 
received to bring an item back to full service. To determine MTTR and ADT, we 
obtained the total Maintenance Downtime (MDT) for deadlined assets from the data we 
obtained from MarCorLogCom for each ERO originating in I MEF between 2009 and 
2011. Without analyzing actual hard copy EROs, EROSLs, and supply documentation, 
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we were unable to derive what fraction of the elapsed time belonged to each of these 
variables separately. For simplicity in this study, we have combined MTTR and ADT 
into one variable based on actual data we have available. We then determined the 
maximum CWT for each ERO. This maximum CWT represents the amount of time it 
took to receive all repair parts ordered under one ERO. Therefore, the MTTR + ADT 
variable was determined by summing the difference between the total MDT and the 
maximum CWT for each ERO, then dividing this sum by the total number of EROs.   
( max )MDT CWTMTTR ADT
n
∑ −
+ =  
Where n = number of EROs. 
Table 2 displays the results of our calculations for MTBF, reliability probability, 
probability of failure, and MTTR + ADT. 
 
Table 2.   Maintenance Variables 
I MEF, 2009 – 2011 




of Failure  
(30 days) 








188.5 85.29% 14.71% 7.36 
 
The data from the MDR obtained from MarCorLogCom contained all requisitions 
for deadlining maintenance events for AAVs from 2009 – 2011. To create our model, we 
identified each critical repair part NSN that I MEF received for the AAV. Since some 
NSNs were received from both the SMU and the wholesale level for different 
requisitions, the CWT from each source varies. Thus, we determined the average and 
standard deviation of CWT based on the weighted average of the requisitions filled by the 
intermediate and wholesales supply levels, which we discuss in greater detail later in this 
chapter.   
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B. MODEL 
After an analysis of the data, the next step in demonstrating how changes in CWT 
impact Ao was the creation of a simulation model. This was our chosen method because 
the previous attempts by the RAND Corporation and the GAO were unable to quantify 
these two variables. The model we created is intended to demonstrate how varying 
amounts of investment in reducing CWT will improve Ao. Our model was built using 
Microsoft Excel and Oracle’s Crystal Ball® simulation software, which is a Monte Carlo-
based simulation software that can be used for predictive modeling, forecasting, and 
optimization. Crystal Ball® is also used in this analysis to estimate the reduction of risk 
associated with the pre-positioning of critical repair parts.   
The model incorporates actual data and the Ao equation to show the “As-Is” 
process and compares it with the “To-Be” position (based on hypothetical re-positioning 
of repair parts based on historical data). Since readiness is reported monthly via the 
DRRS-MC data repository, our model likewise is a snapshot of readiness and failures per 
month. To feed the model, we created a data set that contains all required historical 
maintenance and supply actions from 2009 – 2011. Next, we describe the simulation 
model inputs and output measures in detail.   
1. Model Inputs 
 In this section we discuss the key input fields to our model and provide some 
clarity regarding why we used these fields, and how they can be used to manipulate the 
model. 
a. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) 
  The MTBF for an AAV was derived from the SOE as stated above. The 
MTBF calculation is particularly important to any model used to calculate Ao, since it is 
used to predict what the systems reliability will be in the time period the model is set to 
cover. Every effort should be made to ensure this data comes from the most reliable 
sources. 
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b. Probability of Failure 
 According to the Operational Availability Handbook, the average failure 
rate of an asset, or λ, identifies the expected number of failures within a given time 
period, and is determined by 1/MTBF (DoN, 2003). Reliability of a system is commonly 
assumed to follow an exponential distribution, so reliability over a period of time t can be 
expressed with the cumulative exponential probability at time t (Blanchard, 1998, p. 38): 
 -( ) exp tR t λ=  
Since this is a cumulative probability, this is the probability the system has not failed 
before time t. The probability the system will fail after a period of time t is determined by 
the complement, or 1 – R(t). The probability of failure of an asset determines how often 
an individual asset fails. Based on operating conditions, the reliability of a system rises 
and falls and can be adjusted for known changes in operations commitments.  
To determine the probability of failure of an asset during a month under 
normal operating conditions we used the reliability equation, R(t) = e-λt , where t 
represents usage in days. For our model we represented t as 30 days; however, this rate 
can be altered without affecting the accuracy or reliability of our model. Using the 
probability of failure in this manner allows for this model to accurately predict Ao under 
varying operating situations.  
c. MTTR + ADT 
  In this portion of the header we input the average MTTR + ADT that was 
derived as described in the data section above. To capture the variability in MTTR + 
ADT, we attempted to use goodness of fit statistics to apply to the data we obtained. 
However, no distributions suitably fit the MTTR + ADT values in our data. While the 
lognormal distribution was often determined to be the best fit of those tested, no single 
distribution was determined to provide a sufficiently accurate fit. This caused us to err on 
the side of a more conservative and penalizing assumption. Therefore, we used the 
exponential distribution for MTTR + ADT. The exponential distribution is conservative, 
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in that it is unlikely to understate the risk of a long wait, since it has a high coefficient of 
variation (CV). The parameter for the exponential distribution is the reciprocal of the 
MTTR + ADT.   
d. Data Set 
 The data set we created to build our model consists of 202 NSNs with 
information that is both predictive and informative. For this section we focus primarily on 
the informative nature of the data set. More details pertaining to the data set are discussed 
in the simulation portion of the model description. 
(1) Header Information. The header information used for this 
model includes fields for NSN, Nomenclature, Unit of Issue (UI), Unit Price in dollars 
(UP$), SMRC Code, and CEC Code for each item. 
(2) Probability of Requisition Lookup Columns. In order to 
create a situation where the simulation randomly selects an NSN based on its likelihood 
of being requisitioned, we created a cumulative lookup column using Excel’s “lookup” 
function. To do this, we determined the probability that an NSN would be ordered by 
dividing the number of times the item was ordered by the total number of documents 
requested. We then created a cumulative field that returns the sum of all probabilities, and 
created a column labeled “lookup” to search within the column based on Excel’s random 
number function. We discuss the use of this column in the CWT calculator section below. 
(3) SMU and Wholesale CWT Data. The next pieces of 
information we needed were the actual SMU and wholesale CWT data for all AAVs in I 
MEF from 2009 - 2011. These fields contain the count of total requisitions ordered, the 
quantity demanded at both intermediate and wholesale level, the average customer wait 
time (ACWT), the StDev of CWT, and the coefficient of variation (CV) for CWT at each 
level. This is the information that we later use to predict how CWT affects the system as 
it currently is. One problem we encountered was applying a valid StDev for instances 
when we had less than 10 observations of CWT. Whenever there were less than 10 
observances for CWT, we used the CV of all valid observances to determine the StDev of 
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CWT for those instances. In this manner, we set the average variability of parts lacking 
sufficient observations to the average variability for parts that had sufficient observations. 
 (4) Additional Wholesale CWT Data: In addition to those 
documents for AAVs that passed through the SMU to the wholesale level that we 
captured above, we also pulled in all requisitions for our identified deadlining NSNs that 
reached the wholesale level for all customers and end items using NAVSUP’s Birdtrack 
database. The CWT from this data was then entered into our model so that we would 
have a clearer picture of what to expect at the wholesale level in regard to service and 
wait times. Like the CWT data used above, this data included document number count, 
total quantity ordered, ACWT, StDev of CWT, and CV.  
2. Simulating the present (“As Is”) 
 To properly show how CWT affects Ao we use random variables to simulate how 
the different components of the Ao equation change within the different levels of the 
supply chain. In this next section we discuss the central formulas used to build our model. 
In addition to simulating the present, there are certain shared fields between the present 
and the future that will be discussed in detail below.  
a. End Item Field 
 Our model begins with a simulation of the operational availability of an 
individual AAV. The Logistics Management 2nd Generation (LM-2) Unit Report data as 
reported in MIMMS provides historical readiness rates for the MARES Reportable 
Assets and also identifies the number of assets on hand in I MEF during the time period 
of 2009 – 2011. These numbers fluctuated during our analysis period, so we used the 
average number of AAVs possessed by I MEF as the quantity for our model, which is 
216 AAVs. Our simulation is based on this pool of assets, representing the real 
population of AAVs. Each of the 216 AAVs is represented in one row within the model. 
The model simulates the effects upon each individual AAV for the “As Is” and “To Be” 
Ao and R Ratings during a simulated 30-day period. To replicate these fields for other 
assets under real conditions, one can simply modify the number of rows to match the 
number of assets that the target unit possesses. 
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b. Failure Simulator 
 The next column in the model is the failure generation column. Using the 
probability of failure of an AAV based on the 1 – R(t) equation, we set failure 
determination to randomly occur using Excel’s random number generator function 
(RAND). The equation used in our model to trigger failures is as follows: 
( () ( ),1,0)if RAND P FAILURE= <  
This Excel function is used to determine whether an asset failed or not within our 
simulated 30 day period. The random variable function delivers a random number 
between 0 and 1 for each step of the simulation. The Excel IF function then determines if 
the asset on each row fails during a 30 day period. If a random number above the failure 
probability is randomly selected within Excel, the model simulates that an asset did not 
experience a deadlining event in that month, and thus did not fail. If an asset does not fail 
during the month, the model places a numeral 0 in the cell. No further changes are made 
across this row for this individual asset during this step of the simulation. If a random 
number below the failure probability is selected, the model simulates that an asset 
experiences a deadlining event, and thus has failed. If the asset fails, a numeral 1 is 
placed in the column and thus signals additional actions in subsequent cells to determine 
MDT. This field is incorporated into both the “As Is” and “To Be” models. 
c. CWT Look Up 
 In the data section, we discussed that there are 202 different NSNs that are 
reported to have caused AAV failures between 2009 and 2011 with each having a 
probability of being ordered. When an AAV is determined to fail based on the failure 
generator above, the model uses the Excel random function to determine which NSN is 
selected to be requisitioned. The model uses the lookup function to identify the NSN row 
associated with this random number that is in the lookup column. The values in the 
lookup column are derived based on the probability of that NSN being ordered and the 
cumulative distribution discussed above. This method allows us to randomly select NSNs 
when an item fails within the model.   This function signals that any time an item 
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fails during the month, the model looks up a random number, and return the CWT of the 
item that corresponds to the random value selected within the cumulative distribution.   
Table 3 is an illustration of how the lookup table is set up. For example, 
suppose that the random number selected by Excel is .0588, the lookup function finds the 
value within the lookup column that corresponds to this value. To accomplish this, the 
model will first find the two values that this random number falls between. It then selects 
the lower value, which in this case belongs to NSN 2520–01–459–7021. Once the 
identified row is selected, the lookup function returns the CWT value associated with the 
selected NSN (11.45 days in this case) to be input into the CWT cell for the AAV that 
failed during this simulated month. More detail is forthcoming in the Calculated Ao 
section below. 
Table 3.   Excel Lookup Function Example 
 
 
NSN Nomenclature Doc # Count P(Requisition) Cumulative Lookup CWT
1240013876727 PERISCOPE BODY ASSE 4 0.00132 0.00132 0 17.78
1240013876728 PERISCOPE HEAD ASSE 21 0.00694 0.00826 0.00132 7.42
1240013876729 PERISCOPE ELBOW ASS 14 0.00463 0.01288 0.00826 30.33
1240015535866 THERMAL SIGHTING SY 2 0.00066 0.01354 0.01288 10.42
1240015535870 HEAD ASSEMBLY,AAV 54 0.01784 0.03138 0.01354 46.22
1240015536111 INTERMEDIATE BODY 24 0.00793 0.03931 0.03138 4.38
1240015536957 THERMAL IMAGER SDU 17 0.00562 0.04493 0.03931 122.44
1240015541735 THERMAL ELBOW 41 0.01354 0.05847 0.04493 43.24
2520014597021 YOKE,UNIVERSAL JOIN 3 0.00099 0.05946 0.05847 11.45
2520014597028 YOKE,UNIVERSAL JOIN 1 0.00033 0.0598 0.05946 10.98
2520014597041 UNIVERSAL JOINT,VEH 6 0.00198 0.06178 0.0598 14.25
2520014723051 TRANSMISSION ASSY,5 15 0.00496 0.06673 0.06178 24.26
2520014726681 TRANSMISSION AND CO 116 0.03832 0.10505 0.06673 5.4
2520014728956 TORQUE CONVERTER 2 0.00066 0.10572 0.10505 2.63
2530011024540 TRACK ADJUSTER 23 0.0076 0.11331 0.10572 3.78
2530011024713 WHEEL,SOLID RUBBER 34 0.01123 0.12455 0.11331 16.08
2530011024714 WHEEL,SOLID RUBBER 9 0.00297 0.12752 0.12455 23.15
… … … … … …
6150015783251 WIRING HARNESS 10 0.0033 0.99835 0.99504 4.66
6150015858583 WIRING HARNESS,BRAN 3 0.00099 0.99934 0.99835 78.82
6350014307176 SENSING ELEMENT 2 0.00066 1 0.99934 16.54
1
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Like the failure simulator, the probabilities are based on historical 
observations, not the assumption of any arbitrary probability distribution. So, this method 
places a higher weight on parts with higher demand as the distribution of the lookup 
selection is larger for those items, and smaller for low demand items. The weights are set 
in the exact proportions that demand occurred in the historical data. Once the NSN that 
fails is selected, the model uses Crystal Ball® to determine the actual CWT value to place 
in the CWT field. Data for this field is built in under the Data Set for each NSN to return 
a random variable, as discussed in the following section.   
d. Consolidated CWT “As Is”  
 In order to gain an accurate picture of what CWT to expect under the past 
conditions, we separated all requisitions based on the source of supply, whether from the 
SMU or the wholesale supply chain. We then calculated actual fill rates, total document 
count, total quantity ordered, weighted average CWT (based on fill rate for each NSN), 
and finally a Crystal Ball Assumptions Cell. In the following sections we discuss each in 
greater detail. 
(1) Actual SMU Fill Rate. The actual fill rate used was derived 
from the SMU perspective by taking the number of requisitions filled by the SMU, and 
dividing that number by the total number of requisitions made for that NSN.  
(2) Total Document Count. This field was built simply by 
adding the documents that were filled by the SMU and the Wholesale Inventory levels 
during our 3 year research period. 
(3) Total Document Quantity. This field is derived by taking 
the sum of quantities fulfilled at both the SMU and wholesale level over our 3-year 
research period.  
(4) Consolidated ACWT. To arrive at a consolidated ACWT, 
we had to take the ACWT from the SMU and add it to the ACWT experienced when a 
requisition passes to the wholesale level. The formula used for weighting and adding 
ACWT’s is as follows: 
Consolidated ACWT = (SMU Fill Rate)*ACWT (1 (SMU Fill Rate))*ACWTSMU WH+ −  
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(5) Crystal Ball® Random Variable Generator. This field 
requires the use of Crystal Ball® Monte Carlo simulation software to generate a 
fluctuating value for CWT in each step of the simulation. Again we attempted to use 
goodness of fit statistics to apply to all CWT values; however, no distributions suitably fit 
the CWT values across the NSNs that had more than 30 document numbers associated 
with them. While the lognormal distribution was often determined to be the best fit of 
those tested, no distributions were considered reliable fits. Therefore, we choose to apply 
the exponential distribution to the CWT, because it serves as a more conservative 
measure by overstating CWT values. The parameter for the exponential distribution is the 
reciprocal of the average CWT. Once completed, we repeated this process for each of the 
202 NSNs in our study. At each iteration in our simulation, each cell (one for each NSN) 
randomly generates a CWT based on the exponential distribution for that NSN. When the 
same NSN is selected for more than one AAV during one iteration Crystal Ball® returns a 
discrete CWT value for each simulated requisition of that NSN that is based on the 
exponential distribution. 
e. MTTR + ADT Add In 
 This field is created to add in the MTTR + ADT as computed for the 
model. This random variable is applied to each AAV that fails in our simulation. Based 
on another IF function, Excel will input the MTTR+ADT value into this field if the AAV 
in this row was simulated as deadlined.  
f. Days Available/Days Deadlined 
  The next two columns list the number of days the asset was available 
and/or deadlined. If the asset was deadlined during the month, we simply subtract the 
MDT from 30 to find the needed value for the number of days available. On the other 
hand, if the item is not deadlined during one step in the simulation, then it was available 
for the entire month, or 30 days. This means that the item was available 100% of the 
month for use. 
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g. Calculated Ao 
  The next step was to simply calculate Ao. Within the model we used the 
following modified equation to compute the Ao during one simulation: 
   -   
  o
Total Time Available Deadline Downtime
Total Time Available
A =  
Since our model uses a one-month period for each simulation step, our Ao equation is: 
(30  )
30o
Days DeadlinedA −=  
 This equation allows us to simulate Ao in relation to time. The current readiness 
reported rates for the Marine Corps are snapshots in time that state the current fully 
mission capable (FMC) status at a particular point in time, whereas Ao considers the 
entire time an asset is available. We thus created columns for both readiness and Ao. By 
dividing the number of days an asset was deadlined by 30, we determined the percentage 
of a month that an asset was mission capable in the readiness column. The mean of a 
measure of readiness over time is, in effect, the same as average Ao. 
 One issue that we had to address is that this model appears to assume that all 
assets automatically return to full service at the end of the month. So, we had to make 
sure that we were properly accounting for those times when MDT exceeded 30 days. 
Since our simulation is based on Ao over a 30 day period, whenever days deadlined 
exceeds 30 days for a particular asset, Ao will be identified as negative. For instance, 
when the total days deadlined is 72 days, the model penalizes the Ao calculation by 
factoring in the additional downtime above 30 days. The total impact to Ao lasts for 2.4 
months, which is represented by a negative Ao. Ao for the month in which the item was 
deadlined would have been 0%. Since Ao in the second month would also have been 0%, 
the equation provides a negative 100% availability along with a negative 40% to account 
for the 12 days of the third month. Thus, in our simulated month, Ao for this particular 
AAV is negative 140%. Table 4 demonstrates a simulated step in the model, displaying 
two instances where MDT exceeded 30 days. Hence, although the model appears to 
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assume that all parts are working at the beginning of every month, the effect of down 
times longer than a month is properly captured.  
 
Table 4.   Simulated Month - Ao  
 
Pool of AAVs Failure? CWT MTTR+ADT Days DL Days Avail Ao
1 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
2 1 9 8 17 13 43.33%
3 1 14 8 22 8 26.67%
4 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
5 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
6 1 20 8 28 2 6.67%
7 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
8 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
9 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
10 1 16 8 24 6 20.00%
11 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
12 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
13 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
14 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
15 1 64 8 72 -42 -140.00%
16 1 6 8 14 16 53.33%
17 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
18 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
19 1 25 8 33 -3 -10.00%
20 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
21 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
22 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
23 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
24 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
25 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
26 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
27 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
28 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
29 1 12 8 20 10 33.33%
30 0 0 0 0 30 100.00%
… 216 1 11 8 19 11 36.67%
86.70%One Month Simulated Ao = 
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As our model simulates the Ao for each AAV, we applied the Ao equation to each 
end item row. To derive Ao across all 216 AAVs, we took the average of Ao from the 
entire fleet of vehicles to determine what Ao would be during one iteration of the 
simulation. The final step in completing this part of the simulation was to use Crystal 
Ball® to track the simulated Ao, and capture the distribution of this outcome variable.   
We ran our model for 100,000 iterations, representing 100,000 simulated 30-day 
periods. This high number of iterations allows those NSNs with the lowest demand to be 
represented at least 30 times on average within each trial of our simulation. Crystal Ball® 
displays a probability distribution for results of the simulated Ao. Both the “As Is” 
simulation and the “To Be” simulation have forecasts defined in order to return a 
distribution for each scenario in order to measure the differences between the two. The 
“To Be” simulation scenario is discussed below. 
3. Simulating the future (“To Be”) 
 To properly simulate changes in Ao, we had to devise a method for simulating a 
scenario for what CWT would have been if the SMU had stocked the needed items. In 
order to do this, we found it necessary to establish the criteria for which items would be 
stocked based on CWT thresholds and build in service levels into the model that would 
incorporate a failure-based stocking methodology. A service level is defined as the 
percent chance that the SMU will not stock out during a given inventory cycle. This 
section discusses how we incorporated service levels into the model, what stock 
methodology was used for this model, and ultimately the impact the stock method and 
service levels have on CWT. All these variables can be modified in order to deliver 
results under various scenarios, other than the scenarios we examine in this thesis. In 
other words, the tool we have developed can be used for ‘what-if’ analysis on other 
scenarios. These methods are at the heart of what makes this model work.   
a. CWT Threshold 
 The model provides a cell (input parameter) that allows the user to input 
any value for the average CWT that is desired: a ‘threshold.’  The value that is placed in 
this cell identifies those NSNs from our data set with average CWT above the threshold 
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and select them as candidates for moving forward in the supply chain. The data set is 
arranged so that any SECREP that would be a candidate is not moved forward because 
(as previously explained) SECREPs are outside the scope of this analysis. 
 In establishing these thresholds, we can incorporate new CWTs for those 
repair parts with lead times longer than our established thresholds. The first determinant 
factor is identifying the CWT that is too long, or unacceptable. If CWT is determined to 
be too long, then we must determine how much to stock at the SMU (forward positioned) 
in order to ensure these parts are delivered with the reduced CWT.   
b. Model Stock Determination 
 Our model does not seek to determine optimal stocking criteria for the 
SMU; however, in order to demonstrate improvements in Ao and determine a quantifiable 
relationship between CWT and Ao in monetary terms (i.e., in order to know how much 
our recommendations would cost to implement), we had to apply a stocking methodology 
for the SMU. Due to the variability in both demand and lead time we chose the Re-Order 
Point (ROP) stock determination model. Within our model, the ROP stock method 
determines the appropriate stocking levels by applying a user-selected service level with 
the historical demand pattern for critical repair parts from 2009 to 2011. ROP must also 
be accompanied by an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ); however, optimal order 
quantities are not addressed in this paper and we assume that as an order is placed by the 
customer and fulfilled, an order for replenishment must also be placed by the SMU. The 
formula used to determine ROP in the model is as follows: 
* * ltdROP D CWT Z σ= +  
where: 
D = Average daily demand 
CWT = Lead time in days 
Z = Number of standard deviations above the mean 
σltd = Standard deviation of lead time demand 
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To identify a stocking quantity, we determined safety stock requirements 
in addition to demand during the CWT period. Safety stock is determined by multiplying 
the Z score by the standard deviation of demand during lead time (CWT). A Z score value 
identifies the number of standard deviations an occurrence is from the mean. The Z score 
relates to the service level by indicating the corresponding point on the X-axis on the tail 
of a distribution curve. To obtain a Z score, we used the Excel function of 
NORMSINV(service level). Of course, use of a Z score assumes that demand during lead 
time follows a Normal distribution, a frequently used approximation, and we see no 
reason why it should be controversial. As service level increases, the Z score will also 
increase. The determination of values for our model was relatively straight forward, but 
to ensure that our model took variation in both demand and lead time we applied the 
following equation for σltd: 
2 2 2
ltd l dD Lσ σ σ= +  
where: 
D = Average daily demand 
𝜎𝑙 =  Standard deviation of CWT 
L = Average CWT 
𝜎𝑑 = Standard deviation of daily demand 
c. Service Level to Fill Rate Conversion   
The method we propose to decrease CWT is to pre-position critical repair 
parts forward in the supply chain, hence increasing safety stock levels at the intermediate 
supply activity to ensure those critical repair parts are readily available when they are 
needed. To gain a true picture of system wide wait time it is necessary to consider the 
delivery capabilities of the intermediate and wholesale supply activities within the supply 
chain. Intermediate supply activities do not make, or set, the stocking criteria at the 
wholesale supply level, and consequently when they experiences a stock out, their 
customers are subject to the delivery capabilities of the wholesale network. The charge 
for the SMU is to buffer the MEF against unacceptable lead times. This applies to both 
 38 
CONUS and OCONUS operations, and when done correctly is a key component of 
mission success. Changes to the type and quantities of items stocked at the intermediate 
supply activity is one action that can be taken within a supply chain to reduce MDT while 
long term can be implemented.  
As mentioned, this analysis of improving availability of readiness drivers 
does not provide an optimal stocking methodology for the SMU; however, by applying 
the ROP stock methodology we have created a model that is sensitive to service level 
changes to illustrate the impact of those changes on Ao. Service level is the probability 
that the SMU does not stock out during a cycle. Higher service levels result in higher fill 
rates, which will aid in buffering the impact of unacceptable CWT levels at the wholesale 
supply activities. Fill rates are not exactly the same as service levels. The fill rate from 
the SMU tells us the percentage of demand fulfilled from SMU stock.   
Having a model that uses service level to determine the appropriate stock 
level at the SMU creates an interesting dilemma, as DoD reports performance based on 
fill rates. To align our research with this standard and to derive accurate Ao calculations, 
our “As Is” and “To Be” models were also built to incorporate fill rates into their 
calculations. The “As Is” model uses the actual data between 2009 and 2011 to form the 
consolidated CWT based on the fill rate of those NSNs over that period. Where the “To 
Be” model differs is in its application, which delivers a more accurate forecasted Ao 
calculation. The “To Be” model assumes that at higher service levels, the SMU can 
deliver according to their optimal delivery capabilities. Since our model uses fill rates to 
weight the CWT experienced from both the intermediate and wholesale supply levels, the 
optimal delivery capabilities of the SMU will decrease CWT that will result in benefits to 
Ao. Therefore, we converted the service level used in our ROP stock determination to a 
fill rate in order calculate forecasted Ao.   
To determine what fill rate is experienced from a particular service level, 
we had to determine the percentage of stock outs that are expected per cycle and compare 
that number to demand over lead time. In the process of determining fill rate, all terms 
were converted into daily terms in order to correspond to the CWT measurement that is 
in days. There are two critical components to finding the number of expected stock outs, 
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which are the standard deviation of lead-time demand and the standard normal loss 
function. The standard deviation of lead time demand for service level to fill rate 
conversion is the same as discussed in the model stock determination method above. The 
equation for finding the number of expected stock outs per cycle is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ltdN R L z σ=  
where:  
N(R) = The number of expected stock outs 
L(z) = The standard normal loss function 
σltd = The standard deviation of lead time demand 
The standard normal loss function represents what the expected value of 
losses will be, given that we experience a loss. The expected value of our loss is driven 
by the Z value that our stock method is based on. Selection of a desired service level as 
an input to the model provides a Z score. Anytime the input for service level is changed, 
the Z score in the model will update. Using the Z score, we can formulate a loss function 
that provides us with a conditional expectation of stock outs. To derive the standard 
normal loss function we use the following equation: 
( ) ( ,0,1, ) *( ( ))L z NORMDIST z FALSE z NORMSDIST z= − − ) 
Once the standard deviation of lead-time demand and standard normal loss 
function have been computed, the number of expected stock outs per cycle can be 
calculated. By multiplying the standard deviation of lead time demand by the loss 
function, or L(z), the number of expected stock outs per cycle is determined. The fraction 
of requisitions that are not filled is then derived by dividing the number of expected 
shortages per cycle by the expected demand during lead time. This fraction is then 
subtracted from 1 to provide the “To Be” fill rate. This allows the model to confirm that 
as service levels increase, the quantity to be stocked increases. As a result, the number of 
expected stock outs decreases and thereby increases the fill rate.  




= −  
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 Figure 1 is a notional chart that depicts a service level with safety 
stock comprising Point X to Point Y, with Point X representing average expected 
demand. The probability of a stock out is represented by the area under the curve that is 
greater than point Y. Higher service levels will result in the requirement to increase 
safety stock to increase the probability that demand is met. This depicts the impact that 
service level has on inventory levels, and is at the heart of determining the fill rate 
discussed above. 
 
Figure 1.   Probability of Stock Out 
d. New System CWT Metrics for the “To Be” model   
The final step in simulating the “To Be” conditions of the model is to use 
the new fill rate to determine what CWT would be under these altered conditions. When 
fill rates are set at different thresholds, then “To Be” CWT is derived using these new 
metrics in the same fashion as was described under section B.2.d Consolidated CWT “As 
Is” of this chapter. While the methods are the same, the data sources are different. The 
new weighted average for our scenario is derived from the new fill rate, and pulls its 
CWT data from Birdtrack’s wholesale CWT data and SMU delivery times under ideal 
conditions. For those items that the model selects to be pre-positioned at the SMU under 
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our “To Be” analysis, the CWT for those items from the SMU is changed to 2.67 which 
is the average CWT experienced by the SMU when backorders are removed. This 
average is consolidated with the CWT from DLA and modeled as an exponential random 
variable to account for deviations in delivery to units aboard Marine Corps Air Station, 
Yuma, Arizona and the Marine Air Ground Combat Center in Twenty-nine Palms, 
California. We selected these values based on data received from the I MEF SMU in 
Camp Pendleton. We included this data as an input for the “To Be” conditions in the 
model that can be adjusted based on the time it takes for the intermediate supply activity 
to deliver to their customer.   
Another area where the “To Be” differs from the “As Is” model is that not all 
NSNs are impacted by our stocking methods. Based on the threshold for moving items 
forward, the fill rate, ACWT, and StDev of CWT for the new model were left unchanged 
for items that did not meet the criteria for forward positioning. This applies to items like 
SECREPS, which are left unchanged in our study, as well as any NSN that has a CWT 
threshold less than the threshold set during the input process.  
4. Model Outputs 
 In addition to simulated Ao and readiness for both the “To Be” and “As Is” 
scenarios, there are four additional outputs required to fully measure the benefit of 
forward stock positioning. These outputs include the number of FMC systems under both 
conditions, how many NSNs are impacted by our stock methods, how much money is 
required in total outlay, and how much of our recommended addition to forward-
positioned inventory is at risk of not being used. These variables provide a final 
dimension whereby we can measure the cost of CWT reductions. Once the cost of our 
material stock decision is realized, measuring the impact our investments will have on Ao 
becomes more apparent. 
a. Mission Capable Systems “As Is” and “To Be” 
 The first output we built into the model was a measure of the total FMC 
systems expected under both the “As Is” and “To Be” conditions. To derive this 
information, we multiplied the Ao during one month by 216 to return the total number of 
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expected AAVs available during that month. Using Monte Carlo simulation we can 
determine not only the average number of FMC systems, but the probability distribution 
of likely outcomes for FMC systems. These distributions can be used to answer post-hoc 
analysis questions such as “How likely is it we will have at least 185 mission capable 
AAVs?”  The distributions are generated for both the “As Is” and “To Be” alternatives, 
so that they can be compared on the basis of risk, and not just average performance. 
b. NSNs Moved Forward 
 The second additional input we needed was the number of NSNs impacted 
by our CWT threshold. The model sums the total number of NSNs that are candidates for 
pre-positioning and displays the information in the output section.   
c. Total Outlay 
 To place this relationship in monetary terms, we must first identify the 
investment required to stock those NSNs that are pre-positioned in terms of total outlays. 
As discussed previously, the desired service level will determine the quantity of each 
NSN that requires investment. Intuitively, lowering CWT at various thresholds and/or 
raising the service level results in varying levels of additional investment. Modifications 
of these variables will demonstrate the relationship under our “To Be” analysis. Total 
investment outlay is determined by taking the unit price and multiplying the desired 
quantity stocked, as in the following equation: 
$*i iK UP n=  
where 
Ki = Total outlay of NSNi purchased if CWT threshold is exceeded  
UP$i = Unit Price of NSNi 
ni = Recommended SMU stocking level for NSNi 
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d. Monetizing the Relationship between CWT and Ao with CIVaR  
Total outlay paints the picture for the one-time cost of our stocking 
methodology, but does not account for the likelihood that what we stock will be ordered. 
What is or is not ordered is important because when items are ordered, the SMU is 
reimbursed for the item by the unit ordering it. To fully grasp the relationship between 
CWT and Ao, we must determine the cost of reducing Ao, and thus monetize the 
relationship. There are two general components to the ROP-based stocking method 
recommended in this study:  the cycle stock and safety stock. On average, the SMU 
assumes the entirety of risk associated with the safety stock they hold, because it is above 
and beyond the average number of expected items demanded. Cycle stock, however, is 
expected to be used but has the potential of not being used based on fluctuations in 
demand. If these critical repair parts are projected to be ordered sometime throughout the 
fiscal year, then there is limited budgetary concern for that fiscal year.   
It is important to know the likelihood that SMU-stocked items will not be 
used, because this provides a true measure of what the real cost our stock method has due 
to uncertainty. When an item is stocked at the supply activity (e.g., SMU) but not used, 
then the supply activity is penalized for the overage. This overage is essentially the 
holding costs and opportunity costs of money that was tied up in excess inventory. To 
compute the penalty for items that may not be demanded, we use a variant of the 
conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) metric proposed by Rockafellar & Uryasev (2000). For 
the purpose of this study, we call this the conditional inventory value-at-risk (CIVaR) and 
it will show the true cost of our material stock decisions based on risk. Within our 
analysis, the CIVaR will include the safety stock and the cycle stock needed to achieve 
various service levels and reduce CWT. This study serves to identify the potential penalty 
of inventory cost in nominal dollar terms for safety stock and cycle stock, but does not 
identify ongoing holding costs or the SMU’s opportunity costs of using those funds for 
other purchases. In other words, we are providing an approximate measure of the budget 
impact to the SMU, assuming they currently carry no local stock of the item. We are not 
attempting to measure the incremental cost, because that would require a detailed 
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knowledge of the current stocking methodology, and a prescription for the “To Be” 
stocking methodology. 
To determine the probability of demand for repair parts at various 
quantities, we had to apply a distribution to demand. The Poisson distribution can be 
applied when occurrences are independent of each other and the average number of 
occurrences for a given time period is known (Hu, 2008). Demand for repair parts meets 
the Poisson distribution requirements, and thereby it was chosen as the distribution of 
future demand in our model.   Using the Poisson distribution we computed the average 
demand during lead time which serves as the mean in our CIVaR calculation. The model 
uses the probabilities that demand equals incremental values during lead time to calculate 
CIVaR. Thus, the model calculates CIVaR for those items chosen as candidates for 
forward positioning at the SMU. 
We used the Excel “Poisson” function to determine the probability that 
demand will be less than the “To Be” stocking level (in which case, the extra stock would 
be excess). The CIVaR is calculated for each incremental occurrence of possible demand 
below our stocking level by first multiplying the probability that demand is equal to a 
value X by the difference between the recommended stock and demand x by the unit price 
of the NSN. Then, the sum of each incremental value x gives us the CIVaR. The equation 
used to calculate the CIVaR is derived as follows: 
0





P X x N x UP
=
= = −∑  
where  
Nt = “To Be” stocking level 
X = Projected value of actual future demand during lead time 
x = Target value of demand during lead time 
UP$ = Unit price of the NSN selected 
  An example of the CIVaR concept is graphically depicted in Figure 2. 
Based on the assumption of Poisson demand, the average quantity demanded is 5 for this 
notional NSN. At the 90% service level, the ROP stocking methodology recommends a 
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notional stocking posture of 8. The shaded area represents the probability that demand is 
between 0 and 8. The CIVaR will be equal to the sum of the probability at each value 
from 0 to 8 multiplied by the difference between the stock quantity and each potential 
demand value from 0 to 8 multiplied by the unit price of this notional NSN.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Notional CIVaR Depiction 
Equally important to how the model calculates CIVaR is its relationship 
with total outlay. The CIVaR changes as service levels and CWT thresholds are modified 
since stocking levels correspondingly change. The model also simulates the impact of 
these changes by dividing the CIVaR by total outlay, which tells us the percent of our 
investment that is at risk of not being used. Intuitively, as service levels are increased so 
does the CIVaR. 
C. MODEL VALIDATION 
The model described above is designed to show the impact of reductions in CWT 
on Ao, and it accomplishes that task by comparing the operating conditions of the past 
with an alternative stock policy. With this in mind and before the model could be used, 
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the first step was to validate the simulated “As Is” scenario comparing it with the 
historical readiness data. To make our comparison, we looked at the historical LM2 Unit 
Report data that identified readiness rates on a weekly basis from 2009 – 2011. We then 
conducted simulations using Crystal Ball (100,000 trials) which created the “As Is” 
simulation Ao and readiness data. A comparison of the results of our simulation and the 
actual readiness rates are in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.   Comparison of Actual and Simulated Readiness 
I MEF, 2009–2011 
TAMCN Nomenclature Avg # of Assets 
Avg R% 
(historical) 










216 87.39% 5.23% 86.55 % 5.8% 
  
  
While the historical readiness mean and standard deviation are similar to the “As 
Is” simulated readiness mean and standard deviation, we further validate the model by 
examining the entire distribution of Ao. To accomplish this, we examined our simulated 
results using the method that the Marine Corps uses to report readiness levels. Marine 
Corps Order 3000.13, Marine Corps Readiness Reporting Standard Operating 
Procedures, directs that units report their readiness information monthly via DRRS.   The 
criteria set forth by this directive are as follows: 
R1  –  R  ≥ 90% 
R2  –  70% ≤ R ≤ 89% 
R3  –  60% ≤ R ≤ 69% 
R4  –  R < 60% 
 These levels indicate that if a unit’s equipment readiness is above 90%, that unit 
will have a R1 rating. If the unit’s equipment readiness is above 70% and below 90%, 
that unit will have a R2 rating, and so forth. Referring to our historical readiness data, the 
tails of that distribution revealed that under current operating conditions 34.6% of the R 
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values were in R1, 65.4% in R2, 0% in R3, and 0% in R4. Our simulation of 100,000 
iterations revealed that the data under continuous use falls out in a similar fashion with 
30.6% of all observances occurring on R1, 67.9% in R2, 1.3% in R3, and 0.2% in R4. 
This data is presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.   Historical and Simulated Readiness DRRS Comparisons 
Threshold Level Historical Readiness Simulated Readiness 
R1 34.6% 30.6% 
R2 65.4% 67.9% 
R3 0% 1.3% 
R4 0% 0.2% 
 
 The small disparities between the historical data and our simulation output 
support the validity of our model. Moreover, even these small disparities can be 
explained by the way that DoD uses equipment. Peltz et al. (2002) describes DoD 
equipment usage and demand for repair parts as being tied to unit operational 
commitments and training schedules. Hence, readiness rates are driven as a result of the 
operational tempo of the unit. According to operations and maintenance personnel at 3d 
AAV Battalion in Camp Pendleton, CA, the current operating tempo in CONUS for 
AAVs is a 3:1 ratio between field training and garrison usage. In other terms, the 
battalion conducts field exercises during one week per month on average, which accounts 
for approximately 25% of a month. During field training, AAVs operate approximately 
8–10 hours during the week on average. While in garrison, the AAVs are exercised 
approximately 1.5 hours per week. Thus, most failures result from heavier usage of the 
AAVs during 25% of the month.   
As the AAVs are used during field training, failures result more often than when 
they are only minimally operated in a garrison environment. Therefore, demand for repair 
parts occurs at a higher rate near the end or after a field exercise. During limited 
operations in garrison, when preventive maintenance primarily occurs, demand for 
critical repair parts is diminished. The result is “lumpy” demand patterns. Although our 
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model demonstrates the effects on Ao over time, it assumes continuous use of assets. As a 
result, we expect to see fewer occurrences near the 100% readiness level and 
subsequently fewer occurrences above 90%, and ultimately a greater proportion of 
observations closer to the mean. In this manner, our model marginally overstates 
readiness risk of asset availability on the right side of the Ao distribution tail. 
On the left side of the data we also observe more items reaching R3 and R4 in our 
simulation model than in the historical data. The lack of observations in the historical 
data in the R3 and R4 thresholds is indicative of maintenance actions taken outside of the 
normal supply channels, known as workarounds. These workarounds are actions such as 
selective interchange and part swapping between units that allow the maintainer to repair 
equipment without having to wait for supply support. However, our model marginally 
understates readiness risk on the left side of the distribution’s tail. Because of this 
underestimation, we do not expect improvements to Ao or changes throughout the 
distribution to be directly derived from the difference between the historical conditions 
and the model outputs. The benefits of this model will instead be measured based on the 
changes seen between the “As Is” and “To Be” simulation outputs.   
 Based on the similarities in the historical data and our simulated “As Is” data, we 
conclude that our model has high fidelity in capturing the relationship between Ao and 
CWT. We believe that our model is valid for demonstrating the effects on Ao as we make 
changes to CWT for critical repair parts. There is no reason to believe that the 
distribution of the actual data and the simulation are different, but this cannot be 
validated without an operational test. When conducting our “To Be” analysis, we must 







V. ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
 In the Methodology chapter, we provided a means of simulating Ao based on 
historical CWT and failure data. Within these simulations, adjustments can be made to 
the input variables in the model that will provide different scenarios in the “To Be” 
portion of the model. The model is versatile in its capability of comparing the “To Be” Ao 
with the “As Is” scenario to show the benefit of various material stock decisions based on 
changes in the input criteria. This model bridges the gap found by the RAND 
Corporation, the DoD Inspector General, and other DoD agencies looking to quantify the 
impact of material decision on Ao by narrowing the focus to one end item down one 
supply chain. This model then serves as a decision tool to aid leaders in making stock 
decisions based on both cost and benefit. The analysis is designed to answer the 
remaining research questions: 
1) What CWT thresholds should we examine for target reduction? 
2) What should our desired service level be for part stocking criteria? 
3) What is the likely return (in terms of Ao) on our investment in CWT, and what 
is the riskiness of that return on investment? 
To answer these research questions it was necessary to alter the “To Be” CWT 
data experienced in the system to that of the conditions the SMU experiences under 
optimal conditions. Our analysis begins with testing the model’s impact on Ao at various 
inputs for both Service Level and CWT thresholds. In addition to improvements in Ao, 
Monte Carlo simulation reveals that there are benefits found throughout the distribution 
of Ao, such as in improvements in DRRS-MC reporting categories. The distributional 
benefit requires further discussion, and reveals that material stock decisions serve to not 
only improve upon the average, but they improve upon our readiness risk. Having 
explored the benefits, we then discuss the total investment at risk, which demonstrates to 
decision makers the costs of various material stocking options. Lastly, we look at the 
limitations of this model, and discuss the relevance of our model under these conditions.  
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A. CWT THRESHOLDS AND SERVICE LEVEL ANALYSIS 
The objective of this research is to use simulation modeling to show the impact 
that CWT reductions (via various material stock decisions) have on Ao. The model 
produces results based on the desired service level and CWT threshold inputs. To test the 
possible outcomes, we ran simulations of the model based on the service levels of 0.8, 
0.9, 0.95, 0.99 with CWT thresholds of 30, 20, 15, and 10 days in a 4x4 factorial design. 
That is, we simulated all 16 scenarios resulting from the combinations of four service 
levels with four CWT thresholds. These levels represent a range of acceptable service 
levels and CWT thresholds. We did not specifically test for interaction (that is, we did not 
test to see if simultaneous changes to CWT threshold and service level had a 
multiplicative effect), although the Ao results would incorporate any interactive effect 
(implicitly in the simulation). 
As we ran the model using these possible scenarios, we found significant and 
quantifiable improvements to average Ao. Table 7 illustrates how Ao responds to CWT-
based material stock decisions. 
 
Table 7.   Impacts on Ao at Various SLs and CWT Thresholds 
 
 
When comparing the model results to our simulated “As Is” Ao of 86.54% against 
a policy that sets a .80 service level with a CWT threshold of 30 days, the model 
recommends that we alter our stock methodology for 25 NSNs, and that we can expect a 
1.07% improvement to Ao. On the other end of that spectrum, at the .99 service level, 
when the CWT threshold is set to move forward all items that have a CWT greater than 
Observed Ao (Mean, StDev, 100,000 trials): CWT and Service Level Martrix
"As Is" Ao: 86.54%, StDev:  5.81%
Result Cells: Ao StDev Ao StDev Ao StDev Ao StDev
 SL - 0.80 87.41% 5.52% 87.48% 5.51% 87.81% 5.48% 88.37% 5.46%
 SL - 0.90 87.62% 5.51% 87.74% 5.51% 88.14% 5.50% 89.02% 5.44%
 SL - 0.95 87.68% 5.55% 87.85% 5.54% 88.35% 5.48% 89.27% 5.41%
 SL - 0.99 87.76% 5.53% 87.93% 5.51% 88.43% 5.49% 89.43% 5.39%
NSN - MOVED FORWARD
CWT > 30 CWT > 20 CWT > 15 CWT > 10
25 38 59 106
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10 days, the model recommends to alter the stock method for 106 NSNs and provides that 
we can expect an improvement of nearly 3% to Ao. The difference between 1 and 3 
percent when put in terms of weapons systems is quite significant. What these numbers 
actually represent is the addition of between 2.16 and 6.48 additional FMC systems on 
average. In the case of an AAV battalion, this represents the ability to get an additional 
42 or 126 Marines into the fight.  
Figure 3 demonstrates the impact that various service levels have on Ao based on 
a 10-day CWT threshold.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Impacts to Ao at 10-day CWT Threshold and Various SLs 
When increasing service levels, we intuitively expect the mean to move up 
significantly, but there is actually little impact to Ao. CWT threshold, on the other hand, 
appears to have a more significant impact on Ao. Using the .90 SL, Figure 4 displays how 
Ao improves with each CWT threshold reduction. 
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Figure 4.   Impacts to Ao at .90 SL and Various CWT Thresholds   
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that the very act of targeting critical NSNs for CWT 
reduction results in significant gains to Ao. As we throw more and more material at the 
problem we find that the gains are marginally increasing, but there is another benefit that 
must be analyzed before we can capture the complete benefits of forward positioning 
stock. This turns our analysis from changes in the average Ao to identifying how much 
risk can be reduced through material stocking decisions. 
B. REDUCTION OF READINESS RISK 
According to Kang, Doerr, and Sanchez (2006) and Kang, Doerr, Apte, and 
Boudreau (2010), readiness risk measures the probability that Ao will fall below, or 
between, identified ranges. In addition to being able to measure the benefit to 
improvements in the average Ao, Crystal Ball’s Monte Carlo simulation software allows 
us to dissect the distribution of Ao. Using Crystal Ball to analyze the simulated 
distribution allows us to measure differences in Ao at various ranges in the distribution, 
which lends to the quantification of readiness risk. This analysis will compare readiness 
risk between the “As Is” and the “To Be” scenarios to derive an expected benefit. 
Crystal Ball® allowed us to track the observations of the data based upon their 
likelihood of occurrence. For example, when using inputs of a service level of .9 and 
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CWT threshold of 10, Crystal Ball allowed us to estimate the probability of Ao falling 
below 85%, as shown by Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Probability of Ao below 85% (.90 SL and 10-day CWT Threshold) 
This chart tells us that there is a 18.69% probability that Ao will be below 85% under 
these conditions. This is compared to the 32.37% probability that Ao falls below 85% in 





Figure 6.   Probability of Ao below 85% (“As Is” Simulation) 
In addition to the left tail of the distribution, we can look at how the distribution 
shifts by setting the lower bound to .9 without an upper bound to show the probability of 
Ao occurring above 90% as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Probability of Ao above 90% (.90 SL and 10-day CWT Threshold) 
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Focusing on the right tail allows decision makers to measure the probability of readiness 
falling within the R1 threshold of DRRS-MC. Additionally, when missions dictate that a 
minimum level of readiness or a minimum number of FMC systems is required, the 
model can provide a forecasted probability of attaining a desired goal. The information 
that Figure 7 reveals that we can be 51.01% certain that Ao will be above 90% in a given 
month.   
 Crystal Ball’s frequency chart provides the means whereby the entirety of our 
simulated distribution can be sampled and measured against the base case to show the 
benefit of material stock decisions. To demonstrate the impact of readiness risk, we 
recorded the probability of Ao being lower than 85%, as well as the probability of Ao 
falling within the DRRS reporting R1, R2, R3, and R4 ranges. The results of this analysis 
are found in Table 8. These are quantile estimates provided by Crystal Ball® after a 
simulation run of 100,000 iterations. We did not seek to qualify these estimates in any 
way (for example, by building a confidence interval around the estimates), but simply 
present them as descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 8.   Impacts to DRRS-MC R-Levels at Various SLs and CWT Thresholds 
 
CWT TH SL P(R < 85%) DRRS R1 DRRS R2 DRRS R3 DRRS R4
30 0.80 26.64% 36.79% 62.08% 0.99% 0.14%
30 0.90 25.45% 38.66% 60.27% 0.93% 0.15%
30 0.95 25.06% 39.40% 59.54% 0.91% 0.15%
30 0.99 24.66% 40.03% 58.92% 0.89% 0.16%
20 0.80 26.29% 37.68% 61.20% 0.98% 0.14%
20 0.90 24.89% 39.83% 59.14% 0.91% 0.12%
20 0.95 24.27% 41.07% 57.87% 0.93% 0.14%
20 0.99 23.87% 41.68% 57.29% 0.92% 0.12%
15 0.80 24.41% 40.37% 58.60% 0.92% 0.12%
15 0.90 22.83% 43.43% 55.58% 0.88% 0.12%
15 0.95 21.72% 45.41% 53.64% 0.83% 0.12%
15 0.99 21.46% 46.17% 52.95% 0.77% 0.11%
10 0.80 21.79% 45.53% 53.59% 0.78% 0.11%
10 0.90 18.79% 51.01% 48.18% 0.71% 0.10%
10 0.95 17.18% 53.30% 45.96% 0.66% 0.09%
10 0.99 17.35% 54.54% 44.76% 0.61% 0.09%
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Figure 8 further demonstrates the reduction of risk in terms of the probability of 




Figure 8.   Probability of Ao below 85% at Various SLs and CWT Thresholds  
Within the confines of financial capability, this model provides a means whereby 
decision makers can choose an option based on service level and CWT threshold that best 
meets the operational requirements of the future. The benefits of reducing CWT must 
include both measurements of the average and the distributional gains related to those 
decisions.   This type of analysis makes the benefit of reductions in CWT easy to 
understand, but we must also address the monetary implications of material stock 
decisions. Seeking the most value for the investment should drive DoD’s material stock 
decisions, and due to funding constraints there are always points where cost outweighs 
the benefit. This model does not identify these points where cost outweighs benefit, but 
instead provides a tool for decision makers to determine the value of improvements to Ao 
and risk reduction.   
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C. INVESTMENT RISK ANALYSIS 
A true cost analysis of our model’s recommendation from the Navy’s perspective 
would require examining the cost of holding stock (at all echelons) against the cost of 
deadlining events (somehow monetized). This is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, as we have done with our analysis of Ao and CWT, we maintain our 
perspective at the SMU level. Even here, we cannot really calculate the incremental cost 
of our policies, because we do not have the data (current stocking levels and policies) to 
calculate the cost of the status quo, and hence, cannot calculate the incremental costs of 
the changes we are recommending. 
However, we can provide a limited estimate of the one-time budgetary impact of 
our recommendations on the SMU. There are two financial measures used in this research 
to show the budgetary impact of stock level decisions. The first of these is the total 
outlay, or the total cost of purchasing all material recommended by our model. However, 
estimating the budgetary impact on total outlay is inadequate, as there is a portion of the 
investment which will be used and thereby the SMU will be reimbursed for the cost of 
those items. The true budgetary impact to the SMU is the stock moved forward in the 
supply chain that is not used in the current budget year. In hindsight, this would seem to 
represent an unnecessary expenditure to the SMU in the current budget year. However, 
we cannot call this a cost, because the material will eventually be used, and the SMU will 
eventually be reimbursed (given that the items have sufficient shelf life and do not 
become obsolete). The point is that, in hindsight, the SMU did not need to expend the 
funds this year.   
The CIVaR described in the methodology chapter provides an answer to how 
much our material stock decisions impact the budget. We understand that actual cost 
would also need to incorporate the savings from reductions in expedited part shipments; 
after all, the SMU can order its needed inventory at a lower priority and thereby forego 
expedited shipments, but for the purpose of this project we assume the shipping cost to be 
constant. Finally, note that since we do not know the current stocking allowances at the 
SMU, we cannot really be sure about the incremental expenditure required to raise 
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service levels or reduce CWT to the desired threshold. Hence our CIVaR estimates are 
best considered as upper bounds, or maximum additional expenditures required, rather 
than estimates of average expenditures required. The CIVaR associated with each service 
level and CWT threshold are provided in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.   CIVaR:  CWT and Service Level Matrix 
 
 




Figure 9.   CIVaR Analysis 
CIVaR: CWT and Service Level Matrix
 
CWT > 30 CWT > 20 CWT > 15 CWT > 10
Result Cells:
SL - 0.80 $57,770 $61,104 $85,650 $138,018
SL - 0.90 $79,501 $83,124 $119,965 $192,978
SL - 0.95 $95,056 $99,860 $143,036 $232,277
SL - 0.99 $132,908 $138,133 $198,108 $319,002
NSN - MOVED FORWARD 25 38 59 106
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Intuitively as we increase the service level, the CIVaR also goes up. This is the 
inevitable result of increasing the amount of safety stock in the system as service levels 
rise. The CIVaR can then be used as the measurement of budgetary impact as compared 
to the benefit in Ao, and thus these results can be measured in terms of return on 
investment of the SMUs limited budgetary dollars. 
We also examined our results in terms of the monetary relationship in terms of 
CIVaR and the resultant Ao. Figure 10 graphically depicts this relationship. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Monetized Relationship between Ao and CWT 
This graph demonstrates the marginally exponential nature of a monetary solution, 
in terms of pre-positioning inventory in order to reduce CWT, and its subsequent impact 
upon improving Ao. As initial investments in pre-positioning inventory are made, 
substantial improvements to Ao result. As inventory investment continues to increase for 
additional NSNs representing additional CWT thresholds, we begin to see a diminishing 
benefit to Ao. Figure 10 can be used by decision makers to determine the most cost 
effective way to achieve a desired end state in terms of Ao. 
In Table 7, we illustrated how increasing stock positions at the various CWT 
thresholds through an increase in service levels tends to increase Ao. Table 10 now 
illustrates the budgetary cost and benefit of material stock decisions at each CWT 
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threshold and Service level in terms of improved Ao, CIVaR, readiness risk, as well as 
from a mission capable unit basis. 
 
Table 10.   Cost / Benefit Matrix 
 
  
When we sort the data according to the number of additional FMC systems we 
can expect, the model is an excellent tool for the decision makers in regard to material 
stock decisions. In such cases when the required number of additional FMC systems is 
our metric, decision makers can select the option that provides that measure at the lowest 
cost. For example, assume that decision makers require 5 additional FMC AAVs above 
their current average number of FMC AAVs. Using the table above, they can simply 
scroll from the bottom to the top of the MC Unit Column until they find a scenario that 
provides the needed mission capable systems. If the end state is a system where we 
require 5 additional FMC systems, then the lowest cost solution is to stock based on a 
CWT threshold of 10 days at the .80 service level. This model provides a flexible system 
whereby stock decisions can be made based on the impact those stock decisions will have 
on the number of FMC systems.   
 Decision makers at the MEF or the SMU can use the CIVaR to measure how 
much of the stocking investment is at risk, which depicts the budgetary impact to them, in 
order to make a fully informed risk/reward decision. Additionally, this information can 
provide decision makers with the cost/benefit of CIVaR in relation to benefits in Ao as 
CWT TH SL "To Be" Ao CIVaR P(R < 85%) DRRS R1 BENEFIT (Ao) FMC UNIT CIVaR/UNIT
30 0.80 87.41% $57,770 26.64% 36.79% 0.87% 1.88 $30,653
30 0.90 87.62% $79,501 25.45% 38.66% 1.08% 2.33 $34,071
30 0.95 87.68% $95,056 25.06% 39.40% 1.15% 2.47 $38,412
30 0.99 87.76% $132,908 24.66% 40.03% 1.22% 2.64 $50,314
20 0.80 87.48% $61,104 26.29% 37.68% 0.95% 2.05 $29,875
20 0.90 87.74% $83,124 24.89% 39.83% 1.21% 2.61 $31,870
20 0.95 87.85% $99,860 24.27% 41.07% 1.31% 2.84 $35,163
20 0.99 87.93% $138,133 23.87% 41.68% 1.39% 3.01 $45,908
15 0.80 87.81% $85,650 24.41% 40.37% 1.27% 2.74 $31,239
15 0.90 88.14% $119,965 22.83% 43.43% 1.61% 3.47 $34,571
15 0.95 88.35% $143,036 21.72% 45.41% 1.81% 3.91 $36,587
15 0.99 88.43% $198,108 21.46% 46.17% 1.89% 4.08 $48,516
10 0.80 88.37% $138,018 21.79% 45.53% 1.84% 3.97 $34,756
10 0.90 89.02% $192,978 18.79% 51.01% 2.48% 5.37 $35,967
10 0.95 89.27% $232,277 17.35% 53.30% 2.73% 5.90 $39,348
10 0.99 89.43% $319,002 17.18% 54.54% 2.89% 6.25 $51,034
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well as the DRRS-MC R-rating levels. A complete account of all results of our 
simulation using all SLs and CWT thresholds is depicted in Table 11. 
 
Table 11.   Summary of Ao / CWT / CIVaR Analysis 
 
SERVICE LEVEL .80
"AS IS" CWT > 30 CWT > 20 CWT > 15 CWT > 10
Ao 86.54% 87.41% 87.48% 87.81% 88.37%
Ao - StDev 5.81% 5.52% 5.54% 5.48% 5.46%
% Chance Ao < 85% 32.23% 26.64% 26.29% 24.41% 21.79%
% Change 5.59% 5.94% 7.82% 10.44%
NSN - MOVED FORWARD  25 38 59 106
Total Outlay  $81,986 $85,728 $121,506 $193,423
Value at Risk  $57,770 $61,104 $85,650 $138,018
% AT RISK 70.46% 71.28% 70.49% 71.36%
R1 - R > 90% 30.60% 36.79% 37.68% 40.37% 45.53%
R2 - 70% < R < 90% 67.88% 62.08% 61.20% 58.60% 53.59%
R3 - 60% < R < 70% 1.31% 0.99% 0.98% 0.92% 0.78%
R4 - R < 60% 0.21% 0.14% 0.14% 0.12% 0.11%
SERVICE LEVEL .90
"AS IS" CWT > 30 CWT > 20 CWT > 15 CWT > 10
Ao 86.54% 87.62% 87.74% 88.14% 89.02%
Ao - StDev 5.81% 5.51% 5.51% 5.50% 5.44%
% Chance Ao < 85% 32.23% 25.45% 24.89% 22.83% 18.79%
% Change 6.78% 7.34% 9.40% 13.44%
NSN - MOVED FORWARD  25 38 59 106
Total Outlay  $103,874 $107,905 $156,263 $248,906
Value at Risk  $79,501 $83,124 $119,965 $192,978
% AT RISK 76.54% 77.03% 76.77% 77.53%
R1 - R > 90% 30.60% 38.66% 39.83% 43.43% 51.01%
R2 - 70% < R < 90% 67.88% 60.27% 59.14% 55.58% 48.18%
R3 - 60% < R < 70% 1.31% 0.93% 0.91% 0.88% 0.71%
R4 - R < 60% 0.21% 0.15% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10%
     
SERVICE LEVEL .95
"AS IS" CWT > 30 CWT > 20 CWT > 15 CWT > 10
Ao 86.54% 87.68% 87.85% 88.35% 89.27%
Ao - StDev 5.81% 5.55% 5.54% 5.48% 5.41%
% Chance Ao < 85% 32.23% 25.06% 24.27% 21.72% 17.35%
% Change 7.16% 7.96% 10.50% 14.88%
NSN - MOVED FORWARD  25 38 59 106
Total Outlay  $119,532 $124,752 $179,445 $288,326
Value at Risk  $95,056 $99,860 $143,036 $232,277
% AT RISK 79.52% 80.05% 79.71% 80.56%
R1 - R > 90% 30.60% 39.40% 41.07% 45.41% 53.30%
R2 - 70% < R < 90% 67.88% 59.54% 57.87% 53.64% 45.96%
R3 - 60% < R < 70% 1.31% 0.91% 0.93% 0.83% 0.66%
R4 - R < 60% 0.21% 0.15% 0.14% 0.12% 0.09%
     
SERVICE LEVEL .99
"AS IS" CWT > 30 CWT > 20 CWT > 15 CWT > 10
Ao 86.54% 87.76% 87.93% 88.43% 89.43%
Ao - StDev 5.81% 5.53% 5.51% 5.49% 5.39%
% Chance Ao < 85% 32.23% 24.66% 23.87% 21.46% 17.18%
% Change 7.57% 8.36% 10.77% 15.05%
NSN - MOVED FORWARD  25 38 59 106
Total Outlay  $157,406 $163,047 $234,598 $375,137
Value at Risk  $132,908 $138,133 $198,108 $319,002
% AT RISK 84.44% 84.72% 84.45% 85.04%
R1 - R > 90% 30.60% 40.03% 41.68% 46.17% 54.54%
R2 - 70% < R < 90% 67.88% 58.92% 57.29% 52.95% 44.76%
R3 - 60% < R < 70% 1.31% 0.89% 0.92% 0.77% 0.61%
R4 - R < 60% 0.21% 0.16% 0.12% 0.11% 0.09%
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D. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 Our model involves looking to the past to forecast the future. Our analysis 
centered on the NSNs whose failures resulted in deadlining events. Based on the failure 
rates of these NSNs, we expect to see similar failures in the future, given the same 
operating conditions (operational tempo, operating climate, consistent maintenance 
personnel skill levels, etc.). If these factors change, then NSN failure rates will also 
change. Additionally, the model does not incorporate other NSNs that will potentially 
have future failures that our analysis did not capture based on historical failures. Better 
forecasting tools would ameliorate this problem, but the examination of forecasting tools 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The model does not incorporate the possibility of a single AAV failing, being 
returned to a mission capable status, and then followed by another failure all within the 
same simulated month. Such occurrences would result in additional CWT as well as a 
corresponding increase in maintenance workload associated with multiple repairs. While 
this is a limitation of the model, we do not believe that this limitation alters the results of 
the simulation in such a manner that will be significant. We have limited support for this 
belief in the fidelity shown by our “As Is” model against the real data. 
As previously discussed, our model assumes continuous use of the PEIs. Even 
though MTBF is determined over time that captures both high and low operational 
tempos, failures will occur more often during periods of high usage. MTBF will be 
determined by the variable use of the weapon system, and will change as ranges in time 
periods are examined. Reliability of the system is thus directly related to operational 
tempo. Further refinement of the model using additional simulation software products 
could possibly demonstrate the results on Ao with sporadic patterns of PEI usage and 
resultant demand for repair parts, as well as multiple failures within a given month.   
As previously stated, our goal did not consist of determining a proper or adequate 
stocking methodology for the SMU. Our use of historical demand data is one such 
methodology that we chose to demonstrate a possible stock posture. Applying other 
proven stocking methodologies based on other criteria could potentially refine the model. 
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As such, this is not necessarily a limitation since our model could be extended to consider 
optimal stock postures. But for the purposes of our study, we limited the determination of 
the relationship between CWT and Ao based on this stocking methodology alone. 
Additionally, our model does not account for the non-unique nature of some 
NSNs. Numerous NSNs are applicable to multiple PEIs. Our stocking methodology for 
this study is based solely on the historical demand for repair parts for the AAV. Stocking 
for some NSNs at the SMU incorporates demand that results due to failures of these 
NSNs on other PEIs, at which point risk pooling of those NSNs will alter the total stock 
quantities. Therefore, our study does not incorporate the stock quantities that the SMU 
already stocks. 
The value determined for CIVaR is based off of the ROP stock model and uses 
this value as the average inventory value during lead time (all of which must be acquired 
incrementally by the SMU to implement this policy). Since we have not tracked current 
allowance levels at the SMU (let alone determined the part of that allowance level which 
could be considered safety stock) we cannot estimate the incremental budgetary 
expenditure. Additionally, our model is only determining CIVaR for one end item, even 
though many of these NSNs are shared across multiple PEIs. The current stocking 
methodology for every PEI that the SMU supports would need to be considered before 
true incremental budgetary impact could be estimated. Hence, we believe that our limited 
‘upper bound’ or ‘maximum’ budgetary impact CIVaR analysis is sufficient for the 
purposes and limited scope of this thesis. 
 Ultimately, our model is limited in that it provides results based on the inputs that 
we have available. Human error in data input into supply and maintenance systems 
affects abilities to use historical data for a picture of actual occurrences. During our 
research, we used the most relevant and accurate data that we obtained to ensure the most 
precise representation of our “As Is” and “To Be” simulations. With additional data 
demonstrating the distribution and variability of MTTR, ADT, and MTBF, the model 
could be updated to demonstrate the effects to Ao across the entire maintenance and 
supply spectrum. Nonetheless, our research using available data indicates that there is a 
quantifiable and demonstrable relationship between CWT and Ao. Yet, as we have 
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learned throughout our research, “a model should not be considered an adequate 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This chapter presents the conclusion of our project, recommendations, and areas 
which should be considered for further research. In this study, we sought to demonstrate 
the intuitive nature between decreasing CWT and the resultant increase in Ao, as well as 
how improvements in Ao inevitably come at a cost. In the fiscally constrained 
environment we are inevitably facing in the future it is imperative to have a tool such as 
this model to show how significant the impact material stock decisions have on 
equipment availability. As we exhibit in the analysis of our research, that cost of material 
stock decisions will vary depending on the methods used to stock material with long lead 
times and the desired end state.   
Through the conduct of simulations with various CWT and service level 
parameters, this study has ultimately presented evidence to substantiate that there is a 
quantifiable relationship between CWT and Ao, albeit a non-linear one. The nature of 
these two variables must be evaluated against the costs of achieving a desired Ao because 
the benefit is not always worth the investment needed to achieve it. The value of the 
relationship can only be determined by the decision makers’ desired end state, whether in 
such terms as a desired Ao, higher probability of required FMC systems, or a certain level 
of risk reduction, all coupled with budgetary constraints. 
A. SUMMARY 
To identify the relationship between CWT and Ao, we determined that we had to 
model that relationship from the most basic perspective. To do this, we examined one 
type of PEI (the AAV) within one supported region (I MEF). This was a different 
approach than other studies in the past that aimed to quantify the relationship between Ao 
and CWT, which were focused on how the aggregate of all parts pertained to the 
aggregate of all equipment in DoD. At its root, the model we created in this project is a 
computer simulation using the Monte Carlo method to show the probabilistic impact that 
changes in CWT have on Ao. To accomplish this task, we took the Ao equation and 
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dissected it into its associated components. Based on historical data of the reliability of 
the AAV, MTTR, ADT, and CWT, our model provides probability distributions of Ao to 
aid decision makers in understanding the likelihood of outcomes. Since the variables that 
make up Ao are not deterministic in nature, it was essential that we study the behavior of 
these variables and assign stochastic values. This added touch of realism ultimately 
allowed us to model the past in a manner where the output of the model was nearly 
identical to the historical data. To arrive at some future end state, the model allows us to 
modify the conditions that affect CWT in order to determine the resultant changes in the 
distributional outcome of Ao.   
This model uses the ROP stock method to set SMU stock quantities at a point 
where fill rates are aligned with user configured service levels, and measure the changes 
in Ao as material with unacceptable CWT thresholds are targeted for forward positioning 
at the SMU. In addition to its adjustability, the model measures the budgetary impact 
such stock methods pose to the MEF through a measure we have coined CIVaR, which 
measures the likelihood that a part is stocked and not used during the budget cycle. For 
the conduct of our simulation, we ran the model for 100,000 simulations at each possible 
combination of service levels of 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99 and CWT thresholds of 30, 20, 15, 
and 10 days. By demonstrating the differences in Ao under current conditions compared 
to Ao under alternative conditions of CWT thresholds and service levels, our model 
demonstrates the level of significance that reducing CWT has on improvements to Ao. 
Our study revealed that, when using various inputs, the associated outputs can be 
recorded to allow decision makers to base the service level and CWT threshold on 
desired Ao end states, given budgetary constraints. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Impact of Additional Variables on Ao 
 While this analysis may provide a foundation for quantifying a relationship 
between CWT and Ao, it is limited in its ability to demonstrate the entire effect on of all 
variables that impact total asset availability. This study primarily focused its analysis on 
supply-based issues and possible adaptions in supply policy that would reveal the 
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quantitative effects in monetary and readiness terms. While we have demonstrated a non-
linear relationship between CWT and Ao, this study is incomplete in providing an 
understanding of how other variables have a role in impacting Ao. CWT analysis alone 
will reveal some of the measures that can be taken to improve readiness; however, to 
come to a holistic approach to improving Ao, further statistical analysis is necessary to 
show the degree to which other variables also impact Ao (MTBF, MTTR, ADT).  
 Such analysis must center on specific improvements to these variables. Improving 
the maintenance process itself, whether through lean initiatives, improved personnel 
management, or improved training, could reveal a decrease in MTTR and ADT, both on 
within the maintenance and supply communities. Additionally, since MTBF of an asset 
relies on the engineering aspects of an asset, analysis conducted on improvements to the 
initial acquisition or engineering aspects of equipment could result in higher levels of 
readiness. As with this study, a cost-benefit analysis would be necessary to determine if 
the received benefit of improved Ao is worth the costs. 
2. Maintenance Capacity 
 Reducing CWT will deliver critical repair parts to the customer, the maintenance 
personnel, at a faster pace; however, this does not inevitably equate to the maintenance 
personnel having the ability to keep pace with improved arrival times of the parts. Further 
analysis is necessary to determine the sufficiency of maintenance capacity in personnel 
and equipment. 
3. Distinct MTTR 
 Our model used the exponential distribution for time to repair. In reality, each 
NSN has its own MTTR with its own distribution. Further analysis is necessary to assign 
a time to repair distribution for each NSN. The associated time to repair distribution for 
each NSN could be incorporated into a final model that would demonstrate the complete 
repair cycle with  more fidelity. 
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4. Wholesale Level Stocking Methodology 
 A secondary approach to this study would be to address the modification of 
stocking methodology at the NICPs at the wholesale level that would decrease CWT for 
critical repair parts. As previously stated, DoD’s goal for average CWT is 15 days. When 
examining the AAV data we used for our research, DLA’s average CWT for critical 
repair parts was 26.24 days. If such wholesale entities as DLA desire to improve 
customer service, a study of their stocking criteria in relation to CWT should be further 
explored in order to demonstrate possible courses of action that can be taken at that level 
to reduce the burden on the services. Further, if the NICPs ensure they address their 
stocking methodology based on the ILC quadrant model discussed by McGowan (2002), 
and couple it with improved service levels, average CWT for critical repair parts at the 
wholesale level should witness a reduction that will result in benefits to Ao. 
5. Repair Part Reliability 
Our study is centered on affecting the impact of CWT for repair parts. Demand 
for repair parts is driven by the rate at which each NSN experiences a failure. While 
supply professionals at the intermediate level can affect the stocking posture of NSNs, a 
further examination by DoD strategic supply professionals may be warranted to seek out 
the acquisition of more reliable repair parts. A study of the comparison between 
investment in pre-positioning repair parts and investment in more reliable repair parts 
may demonstrate the most cost effective method for improving Ao. 
6. Re-posturing of Forces in the Pacific 
 As U.S. forces begin to focus on the Pacific Area of Operations, an increased 
presence in Australia will require investment to ensure a sufficient readiness posture. The 
Australian quarantine process takes up to 3 months for all incoming cargo. Simply 
relying on a robust distribution network to bring critical repair parts to forces operating in 
Australia is clearly inadequate. Pre-positioning the requisite amount and type of repair 
parts will be critical to the success of these forces. Due to the Australian quarantine, 
additional time must be considered when calculating lead time. Our model can assist in 
determining the impact of such investment; however, further analysis is required to 
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determine the unique situation of deploying to Australia and the stocking of additional 
parts that factor in the additional lead time due to the quarantine. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
As we approach the age of reduced budgets, the notion of decreasing inventory, 
especially excess, becomes even more pertinent. Replacing inventory with information 
has become an axiom in logistical arenas, but supply professionals must continue to seek 
intelligent ways to maintain higher levels of readiness while reducing inventory costs. 
This study lays out the first part of this charge, but at significant upfront costs. Supply 
chain analysis must include establishing stronger partnerships between intermediate and 
wholesale supply activities to improve information sharing. In so doing, the very goal of 
each activity of providing logistical support for equipment readiness will become aligned. 
The resultant effects will be higher readiness at lower costs. 
As intermediate supply activities seek to stock the right repair parts in the right 
quantities based on high levels of demand, they will ensure higher fill rates for high 
turnover items. To replace these highly demanded items, intermediate supply activities 
provide high demand to the wholesale level. Variability in demand must be considered 
whether based on seasonality, operational tempo, or some other identifiable factor. 
Without proper communication, both the intermediate and wholesale levels may stock 
unnecessarily high amounts of these items. Consequently, commercial vendors who 
supply the wholesale supply chain also maintain high levels of these items. 
With proper communication between the intermediate and wholesale level, the 
amount of inventory stocked at the intermediate level for these high demand items could 
potentially be reduced. The same can be said for the relationship between the wholesale 
and commercial vendor levels. Such information sharing will reduce the need for upfront 
investments for stocking items that have acceptable CWT from the next echelon in the 
supply chain, resulting in fiscal resources that can be used for items with longer CWT or 
higher uncertainty based on the variability in demand. Therefore, the DoD cannot only 
look at the high demand of critical repair parts in stock determination, but must identify 
those critical assets with long and varying CWT. As the relationship between criticality 
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and CWT is applied, investment in those items can be evaluated using a model such as 
ours to determine the effect on readiness. 
With an understanding that all PEIs and NSNs are not equally important, as 
McGowan (2002) discussed in his article, we can identify that both the intermediate and 
wholesale levels of supply are not addressing the impact that CWT has on Ao. This is 
happening because, without models like this one, there is no clear understanding of the 
relationship between these variables. Our model reveals that arbitrarily assigning service 
levels to tackle the problem will not always produce desired results, and that the gains to 
Ao are rendered irrelevant at certain points due to the high investment of achieving those 
service levels. This study is quantifiable proof that reducing customer wait time will 
improve readiness and readiness risk when the focus of material stock decisions is placed 
on critical repair parts. 
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